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LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON:
FROM HERSKOVITS TO MOHR AND THE NEED FOR
CLARIFICATION
Matthew Wurdeman
Abstract: Loss of chance is a well-established tort doctrine that seeks to balance
traditional tort causation principles with the need to provide a remedy to patients whose
injuries or illnesses are seriously exacerbated by physician negligence. In Washington, the
doctrine continues to create significant difficulties for judges, juries, and practitioners.
Wherever it has been applied, it has often created difficulties. The loss-of-chance doctrine
needs clarification—definitive, sensible, and workable guidelines to ensure that loss of
chance is consistently and fairly applied. Part of the problem lies in the fact that courts and
litigants use the term “loss of chance” as if it has a single, fixed meaning, when in fact it is an
umbrella term that covers three separate—though sometimes overlapping—theories of
recovery. This Comment first identifies and explains the different meanings attached to loss
of chance, and briefly describe its varying implementation among states over the past three
decades. Next, it tracks the evolution of loss-of-chance doctrine in Washington State from its
inception to its current ambiguous status. Then this Comment analyzes the difficulties arising
from ambiguities in the Washington State Supreme Court’s decisions in Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop. of Puget Sound and Mohr v. Grantham, as well as and the recent Washington
State Court of Appeals for Division III decision in Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin
Anesthesia, PLLC. The critique of these three cases underscores the extent to which
ambiguities in loss-of-chance doctrine currently lead to inconsistent and unpredictable
standards of causation and burdens of proof. This Comment concludes by suggesting
concrete solutions to create a coherent and equitable doctrine that will allow plaintiffs to
recover for loss of chance without creating incentives for unfair manipulation of common
law tort standards. In order to illustrate the workability of these suggestions, this Comment
applies them to the facts of Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC. While
this Comment focuses primarily on Washington State law, the solutions presented are
applicable in any jurisdiction that struggles with the loss-of-chance doctrine.

INTRODUCTION
Loss of chance is a well-established tort doctrine, and yet it remains
something of a mystery. Loss of chance allows a plaintiff to recover for
a lost opportunity to survive or recover from an injury or illness due to
the negligence of a defendant, typically a physician. 1 When it applies,
the doctrine stretches traditional causation boundaries, allowing recovery
to plaintiffs who were never more likely than not to survive their illness

1. Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8 FIU L. REV.
591, 591–92 (2013).
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or injury. 2 Such plaintiffs would have no viable claim under a rigid
interpretation of common law tort principles. 3 Although the concept is
simple, and there is widespread agreement among states on the general
principles of the doctrine, in practice courts have struggled to develop
consistent, workable rules for loss of chance. Similarly, legal scholars
underestimated the complexity of this doctrine. In the almost fifty years
since loss of chance was first addressed by a federal court sitting in
diversity in Hicks v. United States, 4 scholars have given little attention to
the doctrine beyond its basic contours. Much of the scholarship
advocates for the adoption or rejection of the doctrine as a whole. 5 Yet
in loss of chance cases, details matter.
This Comment critiques the struggle for coherence in the
development of Washington State’s loss-of-chance doctrine, and offers
concrete suggestions to ameliorate the inequities and inconsistencies in
current doctrine. While this Comment focuses on Washington law, these
suggestions are also relevant to other jurisdictions encountering similar
difficulties.
The 1983 decision in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound 6 is a landmark case for loss-of-chance precedent. 7 A staple
in many torts casebooks, 8 Herskovits addresses three potential
approaches to the loss-of-chance doctrine—the all-or-nothing approach, 9
the substantial-factor approach, 10 and the proportional approach. 11
Herskovits officially incorporated loss-of-chance doctrine into

2. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 619, 664 P.2d
474, 479 (1983) (allowing a 14% loss of chance of survival to go to the jury on proximate cause).
3. Id.
4. 368 F.2d 626, 633 (4th Cir. 1966).
5. See, e.g., Férot, supra note 1, at 621 (suggesting legislation on loss of chance may be the best
option); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1396–97 (1981) (advocating
for adoption of the loss-of-chance doctrine).
6. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474.
7. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
8. See, e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 211–18 (2d ed. 2008) (using
Herskovits to explain loss of chance); RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 482–
91 (6th ed. 1995) (same); FARNSWORTH & GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS 317–32 (2004)
(same); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 279–84 (12th ed. 2010)
(same).
9. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614, 623–25, 632–34, 664 P.2d at 476–77, 481–82, 485–87
(addressing the all-or-nothing approach).
10. See id. at 614–19, 664 P.2d at 477–79 (addressing the substantial-factor approach).
11. See id. at 624–35, 664 P.2d at 481–87 (Pearson, J., concurring) (addressing the proportional
approach).
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Washington State law, at least in cases where a physician’s negligence is
one cause of a patient’s death. 12 However, the court divided on whether
to employ the substantial factor or proportional approach. 13 The lead
opinion employed the substantial factor approach, which is a theory of
causation even if the lost chance is less than even. 14 The concurrence
employed the proportional approach, which is a theory of valuation—it
determines what the lost chance is worth. 15
Almost thirty years later, in Mohr v. Grantham, 16 the Washington
State Supreme Court again addressed the loss-of-chance doctrine. 17 The
Court officially adopted the Herskovits concurrence’s proportional
approach for the loss of a less than even chance, and extended the
doctrine to include loss of chance of a better outcome in situations where
patients survive negligent care but sustain serious injuries. 18 It seems as
if the Court intended Mohr to clarify the loose ends of Herskovits. In
fact, however, Mohr created more problems than it solved, potentially
sowing confusion in future cases.
A recent Washington State Court of Appeals case, Estate of Dormaier
v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC, 19 illustrates the practical effects of
the many unanswered questions of Herskovits and Mohr. 20 In an
internally contradictory opinion, Dormaier utilizes all three loss of
chance approaches to different ends, depending on the issue it is trying
to resolve. 21 The Dormaier opinion demonstrates the need for
clarification and distinct boundaries to help guide trial courts,
practitioners, and juries.
In Part I, this Comment first defines the loss of chance, and then
12. See id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (lead opinion) (holding that a 14% reduction of chance of
survival is sufficient evidence to go to the jury).
13. See id. at 619–20, 664 P.2d at 479 (Pearson, J., concurring) (agreeing with the court’s lead
opinion, but not its reasoning).
14. See id. at 614–19, 664 P.2d at 476–79 (lead opinion) (employing the substantial-factor
approach).
15. See id. at 631–35, 664 P.2d at 485–87 (Pearson, J., concurring) (employing the proportional
approach).
16. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 262 P.3d 490 (2011).
17. See id. at 846–47, 262 P.3d at 491 (“This case compels consideration of whether, in the
medical malpractice context, there is a cause of action for a lost chance, even when the ultimate
result is some serious harm short of death.”).
18. Id. at 857, 262 P.3d at 496.
19. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013).
20. See id. at 844–47, 313 P.3d at 438–39 (addressing the questions remaining after Herskovits
and Mohr).
21. See id. at 844–70, 313 P.3d at 438–51 (employing the all-or-noting, substantial factor, and
proportional approaches); see also infra Part II.D.1.

20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 12:23 PM

606

[Vol. 89:603

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

identifies and explains the five distinct doctrines for which the
seemingly unitary label “loss of chance” has come to stand. It then
demonstrates the uneven implementation of the different approaches
among the states.
Part II traces the history of the loss-of-chance doctrine in Washington
focusing primarily on Herskovits, and the more recent decisions in Mohr
and Dormaier. Following its discussion of each case, this Comment
highlights unresolved legal questions and demonstrates their potential
negative implications in future cases. Parts I and II, taken together,
explain the source of the confusion in loss-of-chance doctrine in
Washington medical malpractice cases.
Part III of this Comment offers a coherent, predictable framework for
Washington courts as they consider future loss of chance cases. It
provides specific solutions to the problems inherent in Mohr and
Dormaier. While this Comment’s solutions are specific to the
proportional approach as it stands in Washington State, the reasoning
behind them is applicable in any jurisdiction currently struggling with
loss of chance.
Finally, Part IV demonstrates the feasibility of implementing the
proposed solutions by applying these solutions to the facts of Dormaier.
Part IV clearly lays out what would be required of a plaintiff’s attorney
in order to successfully bring a loss of chance claim, and provides
guidance to trial courts on how to handle the claim.
I.

LOSS OF CHANCE: COURTS BLUR CAUSATION
BOUNDARIES TO BENEFIT PLAINTIFFS

The loss-of-chance doctrine has been frequently misunderstood. 22 In
part, this misconception arises from the term itself. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines the loss-of-chance doctrine as “a rule in some states
providing a claim against a doctor who has engaged in medical
malpractice that, although it does not result in a particular injury,
decreases or eliminates the chance of surviving or recovering from the
preexisting condition for which the doctor was consulted.” 23 In the
medical malpractice context, loss of chance is most frequently applied in
cases of misdiagnoses, where a timely diagnosis would have given the
patient a statistically better opportunity to achieve a more favorable

22. See Férot, supra note 1, at 591 (“[W]herever [loss of chance] is implemented, it tends to
be . . . misunderstood . . . .”).
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (9th ed. 2009).
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outcome. 24 For example, a patient arrives at the doctor’s office with a
complaint and, due to a breach of the applicable standard of care, the
doctor makes an incorrect diagnosis or fails to make a diagnosis.
Sometime later, the patient is properly diagnosed. Had the patient been
properly diagnosed at the outset, her chances of recovery would have
been 40%. However, due to the delayed diagnosis, the patient’s chances
of recovery are now 10%. This classic example of loss of chance is
deceptively intuitive. In fact, it conceals the complexity of the doctrine.
In practice, loss of chance is an umbrella term, the meaning of which
varies between jurisdictions 25 and sometimes—as in Washington—even
within jurisdictions.26 For example, in medical malpractice cases—the
paradigmatic loss of chance context—there are currently no less than
five different approaches to loss of chance, the differences between
which can affect whether a plaintiff has a viable cause of action in a
particular case. This Part explains those five approaches.
A.

Approaches to the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine

Much of the confusion surrounding loss of chance centers on whether
it is classified as a theory of causation or an injury in and of itself.27 The
“traditional approach” or “all-or-nothing” approach does not recognize
the loss of a less-than-even chance at all. The “substantial factor”
approach deals with loss of chance as a type of causation. The
“proportional approach” classifies the lost chance as the injury itself, and
damages are based on the percentage of chance lost. Two states,
Michigan and South Dakota, passed legislation on loss of chance,
abrogating state Supreme Court decisions that recognized the loss-ofchance doctrine. 28 Three states—Oregon, Utah, and Rhode Island—have
yet to rule on the loss-of-chance doctrine. 29 To aid in explaining the
24. See King, supra note 5, at 1363–64 (illustrating a hypothetical in which a misdiagnosis led to
a 30% lost chance of survival).
25. See generally Férot, supra note 1, at 609–17 (discussing the different approaches); Joseph
King, “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance
Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 492, 505–11 (1998) (same).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See King, supra note 25, at 494 (acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing between
causation and valuation).
28. Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56–57 (Mich. 1990), superseded by statute, 1993
Mich. Pub. Acts 411; Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, (S.D. 2000), superseded by statute,
2002 S.D. Sess. Laws 176.
29. Mandros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 311 (R.I. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that because the loss-ofchance doctrine affects only the causation part of the tort analysis and because the jury never was
required to reach the question of causation, the trial justice’s failure to instruct on the loss-of-chance
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various approaches, this Comment uses the facts from Herskovits v.
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, in which the parties
stipulated to an assumption that the doctor’s negligence caused a 14%
loss of chance of survival and that the decedent’s pre-negligence chances
of survival were less than 50%. 30
1.

The “Traditional” or “All-or-Nothing” Approach

One of the criticisms of the loss-of-chance doctrine is the speculative
nature of the harm. 31 For example, if a doctor misdiagnoses a patient for
cancer, and the patient later dies, it is almost impossible to know with
certainty whether the patient would have lived had a timely diagnosis
been made. 32 Furthermore, and more importantly, the cause of the
patient’s death was cancer. 33 The doctor’s negligence did not give the
patient cancer but only impacted his or her chances of survival. The
“traditional approach,” therefore, refuses to acknowledge loss of chance
because the doctrine goes against “traditional principles of tort
causation.” 34
Some states have adopted a form of loss-of-chance doctrine called the
“all-or-nothing” 35 approach. 36 Under the all-or-nothing approach, the

doctrine is moot.”); Joshi v. Providence Health Sys. of Oregon Corp., 149 P.3d 1164, 1170 (Or.
2006) (holding that under the wrongful death statute, causation cannot be proven by showing an
increased risk of death, and therefore the lost chance argument did not apply); Seale v. Gowans, 923
P.2d 1361, 1365 (Utah 1996) (holding that the case was barred by the statute of limitations, but
stating in dicta that the loss of chance, without proof of actual damages, was insufficient to sustain a
cause of action).
30. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 619, 664 P.2d 474,
479 (1983) (finding that both parties agreed that the Court assume Mr. Herskovits’s chance of
survival was 39%, and the doctor’s negligence reduced the chance to 25%, or a reduction of 14%).
31. See Férot, supra note 1, at 600 (“The loss of chance, as an injury, is often criticized for being
no more than a speculative harm.”).
32. See, e.g., id. (“The identification of the injury . . . . requires making assumptions about what
should have been the course of events in the absence of the tortious act.”).
33. See, e.g., Mohr v. Grantham, 172 Wash. 2d 844, 873–74, 262 P.3d 490, 504 (2011) (Johnson,
J., dissenting) (reasoning that the plaintiff crashing her car caused her ultimate injury, not the
medical professionals).
34. United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Del. 1994); see also Cooper v. Sisters of
Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E. 2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971) (“We consider the better rule to be that
in order to comport with the standard of proof of proximate cause, plaintiff in a malpractice case
must prove that defendant’s negligence, in probability, proximately caused the death.” (emphasis in
original)).
35. The “traditional” and “all-or-nothing” approaches are essentially interchangeable. See King,
supra note 25, at 505–06 (using the two terms interchangeably).
36. See Férot, supra note 1, at 611.
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patient’s lost chance must have been greater than even. 37 Technically,
this is a rejection of the loss-of-chance doctrine, as a loss of a greaterthan-even chance comports with traditional tort notions of causation; in
other words the doctor’s negligence more probably than not caused the
patient’s death or poor outcome. 38 Under such an approach, a plaintiff
who lost a 50% or less chance at a better outcome has no remedy. 39 For
a plaintiff who shows a loss of a 51% or greater chance, the issue can go
to the jury on proximate cause. 40 The “all-or-nothing” approach treats
the lost chance as satisfying the burden of proof for causation. 41
Eighteen states plus the District of Columbia take this approach.42 Using
the 14% loss of chance above, the plaintiff would have no remedy under

37. See id. at 611–15.
38. See, e.g., Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d 882, 888–89 (Miss. 1987) (“Mississippi law does
not permit recovery of damages because of mere diminishment of the ‘chance of recovery.’
Recovery is allowed only when the failure of the physician to render the required level of care
results in the loss of a reasonable probability of substantial improvement of the plaintiff’s
condition.” (quoting Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439, 445 (Miss. 1985))).
39. Stephen Brennwald, Proving Causation in “Loss of a Chance” Cases: A Proportional
Approach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 766 (1985) (“[This] approach requires the finder of fact to
determine whether the decedent’s chances to live or to achieve a more favorable result were more
probable than not. Once the evidence shows that a probability did or did not exist, the inquiry ends.
As a result, chances of less than fifty-one percent are treated as if they were nonexistent.”); see also
Rankin v. Stetson, 749 N.W.2d 460, 469 (Neb. 2008) (“While a 49-percent chance of a better
recovery may be medically significant, it does not meet the legal requirements for proof of
causation.”).
40. See, e.g., Stetson, 749 N.W.2d at 469 (“[A]n opinion expressed in terms that it is more likely
than not that a plaintiff ‘would have had a better outcome’ is sufficiently certain to establish
causation.”).
41. See King, supra note 25, at 505–06 (stating that a plaintiff may prove causation for the
ultimate harm if the lost opportunity was greater than 50%).
42. The all-or-nothing approach is currently used in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia. See Férot, supra note 1,
at 611 (listing states that have adopted the all-or-nothing approach); Stephen Koch, Whose Loss Is It
Anyway? Effects of the “Lost-Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice
Insurance, 88 N.C. L. REV. 595, 607–08 nn.57–59 (2010) (same); see also Boone v. William W.
Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2005) (“[I]t is not sufficient for a lost chance plaintiff to prove
merely that a defendant’s negligent conduct has deprived him or her of some chance; in
Connecticut, such plaintiff must prove that the negligent conduct more likely than not affected the
actual outcome.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Phillips v. E. Maine
Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 308 (Me. 1989) (allowing a medical malpractice claim to go forward after
plaintiff provided evidence that, absent the doctor’s negligence, patient would have had a better than
even chance of survival); Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d 882, 888 (Miss. 1987) (“Mississippi law
does not permit the recovery of damages because of mere diminishment of the ‘chance of
recovery’ . . . . [A cause of action] is allowed only when the failure of the physician to render the
required level of care results in the loss of a reasonable probability of substantial improvement of
the plaintiff’s condition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the “traditional” or “all-or-nothing” approach, as he was more likely
than not going to die anyway.
2.

The “Substantial Factor” Approach

Perhaps the most controversial 43 of the approaches, the “substantial
factor” approach, allows for the lost chance—irrespective of the actual
percentage lost—to go to the jury on the issue of proximate cause
provided that the lost chance was a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm. 44 The Supreme Court of Kansas held that “the loss of chance
of recovery theory basically entails the adoption of a different standard
of causation than usually applies in negligence cases.” 45 And the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the loss-of-chance doctrine
“relax[es] the standard for sufficiency of proof of causation ordinarily
required of a plaintiff.” 46 Thus, the 14% lost chance used above may
impose liability on the defendant, as the jury is free to determine
whether the lost chance was a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm. This is also known as the “relaxed causation approach” and is
criticized as an exception to traditional causation standards. 47 Five states
adhere to this theory. 48
43. See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 508 (“[This] approach represents the worst of both
worlds.”).
44. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 613–14, 664 P.2d
474, 476 (1983) (discussing the relationship between an increased risk of harm and death).
45. Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 182 (Kan. 1994).
46. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. 1987).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Del. 1994) (commenting that
the “relaxed causation approach” is an exception to traditional causation requirements); Herskovits,
99 Wash. 2d at 38, 664 P.2d at 489 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting) (“[A]pplication of the substantial
factor test in these circumstances is truly novel.”); Reigel v. SavaSeniorCare L.L.C., 292 P.3d 977,
987 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that a possible increase in chance of harm being an issue of
causation is inconsistent with the traditional but-for test).
48. The relaxed causation approach is currently used in Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, North
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 (Kan. 1994) (holding that a
substantial loss of chance is sufficient to withstand summary judgment); McKellips v. Saint Francis
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 475 (Okla. 1987) (“[T]he jury may determine that the tortious act of
malpractice was in turn a substantial factor in causing a patient’s injury or death.”); Sharp v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, 710 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Colo. App. 1985) (“Once a plaintiff has introduced
evidence that a defendant’s negligen[ce] . . . substantially increased the risk of harm . . . , and that
the harm in fact has been sustained, it becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine whether
that increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in producing the harm.”), aff’d on other grounds,
741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987); VanVleet v. Pfeifle, 289 N.W.2d 781, 784 (N.D. 1980) (“[I]f the doctors
in this case were negligent in failing to discover Donald VanVleet’s cancerous condition and
thereby hastened and prematurely caused his death, the doctors should not be able to escape liability
simply because the cancer would eventually have resulted in VanVleet’s death even if it were
discovered sooner.”); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1289 (Pa. 1978) (“[L]iability could attach
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The “Proportional” Approach

Under the proportional approach, the loss of chance itself is the
actionable injury. 49 Here the patient’s lost opportunity for a better
outcome is the compensable injury, not the patient’s final outcome. 50 To
prevail, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, and that the provider’s
negligence proximately caused the loss of chance. 51 The negative
outcome and the loss of chance are two distinct injuries.52 However,
courts typically award damages if the patient suffers the negative
outcome in addition to the lost chance. 53 Otherwise it is difficult to
reasonably calculate damages. For example, if a doctor causes a 20%
reduction in a person’s chances of surviving cancer, and that person dies,
the damages will be 20% of what the wrongful death damages would
have been had the doctor’s negligence been the cause-in-fact of the
death. 54 This approach to loss of chance is not inevitable. For example,
courts could award damages for loss of chance based on mental
anguish 55 or a more difficult recovery process, rather than confining
recovery to the negative outcome itself. 56 Twenty-two states have
adopted this approach. 57
if the negligence of the defendant were but a substantial factor in bringing about the death.”).
49. See Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1100 (commenting that the proportional approach
compensates the lost chance); Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 623–24, 664 P.2d at 481 (conceiving the
injury as the reduced chance of survival).
50. See Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1102 (noting that the proportional approach calls for the
redefinition of the injury as the lost chance and not the physical harm); Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at
624, 664 P.2d at 481 (“[If] we perceive the death of Mr. Herskovits as the injury in this case, we
must affirm the trial court . . . .”); Férot, supra note 1, at 596.
51. Férot, supra note 1, at 595.
52. See id. at 596 (“[T]he loss of chance causes an injury independent from the unfavorable
outcome.”).
53. Id. at 596–97.
54. King, supra note 4, at 1381–82.
55. DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W. 2d 131, 139 (Iowa 1986) (recognizing mental anguish as a
basis for damages because the patient “knew her cancer was incurable and her days were
numbered”).
56. See, e.g., Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 281 (Ind. 2000) (holding that worsening of
the patient’s condition was compensable even though he did not die, because while the cancer
remained undiagnosed, the plaintiff suffered the loss of healthy lung tissue, the collapse of a lung,
and the growth of a malignant tumor); Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56 n.43 (Mich.
1990) (noting that harm could be the worsening of the patient’s condition prior to remission),
superseded by statute, 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411, as recognized in O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 791 N.W. 2d 853, 857–58 (Mich. 2010).
57. The proportional approach is currently used in Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
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The Legislative Approach

The Supreme Courts of both Michigan and South Dakota approved
the loss-of-chance doctrine. 58 However, following those decisions the
state legislatures passed laws repudiating this judicially created cause of
action. 59 The Michigan Legislature specifically stated that recovery
would not be allowed for a “loss of an opportunity to survive or an
opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater
than 50%,” which puts Michigan in the all-or-nothing category. 60 South
Dakota is also now an all-or-nothing state. 61 Michigan and South Dakota
remain the only two states that have dealt with loss of chance in the
legislature. 62
Other states, however, are attempting to deal with the doctrine
through legislation. In 2013 the Ohio State Legislature proposed a bill in
which “[a]ny loss or diminution of a chance of recovery or survival by
itself is not an injury, death, or loss to person for which damages may be
recovered.” 63 This statute was proposed explicitly to abrogate Roberts v.
Ohio Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 64 in which the Supreme Court of
Ohio endorsed the proportional approach to loss of chance. 65 The
Massachusetts Legislature also proposed a bill 66 to abrogate the

Wyoming. See Férot, supra note 1, at 610 (listing states that have adopted the theory); see also
Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W. 2d 321, 337 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing plaintiff’s loss of chance
claim); Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 1106–08 (N.H. 2001) (recognizing the proportional
approach to loss of chance).
58. Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W. 2d 366, 372–73 (S.D. 2000), superseded by statute, 2002 S.D.
Sess. Laws 176; Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 57.
59. 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411; 2002 S.D. Sess. Laws 176; see also O’Neal, 791 N.W.2d at 857
(recognizing that 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411 superseded Falcon).
60. 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411.
61. Smith v. Bubak, 643 F.3d 1137, 1142 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]his result does not reveal whether
giving a patient tPA will more likely than not cause a stroke patient to improve, which is the
material inquiry under a traditional proximate cause regime.”).
62. Férot, supra note 1, at 608–09.
63. H.B. 276, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2013) (proposing to enact section
2323.40(B). At the time of publication, this bill had been referred to the Committee House
Judiciary.).
64. 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996).
65. Id. at 484 (“In order to maintain an action for the loss of a less-than-even chance of recovery
or survival, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony showing that the health care
provider’s negligent act or omission increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff.”).
66. S.B. 1038, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2013) (“This section is intended to prohibit the filing of
claims or causes of action based upon the loss-of-chance doctrine adopted by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Matsuyama v. Birnbaum.”).
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proportional approach adopted in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum. 67 The bill
states that a “plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to
survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the
opportunity was greater than 50%.” 68 If approved, this bill will put
Massachusetts in the all-or-nothing category. New Hampshire passed
legislation on the burden of proof in medical injury actions in 2003. 69
The statute was amended to add a third paragraph, which reads:
The requirements of this section are not satisfied by evidence of
loss of opportunity for a substantially better outcome. However,
this paragraph shall not bar claims based on evidence that
negligent conduct by the defendant medical provider or
providers proximately caused the ultimate harm, regardless of
the chance of survival or recovery from an underlying
condition. 70
Some scholars have interpreted this legislation to supersede the holding
in Lord v. Lovett, 71 which recognized the proportional approach to the
loss-of-chance doctrine. 72 This Comment maintains that the statute
expressly rejects the substantial factor approach. However, it still allows
a cause of action when it can be shown, for example, that a physician’s
negligence affirmatively caused the patient’s death even if the patient
had a less than even chance of survival pre-negligence. The statute does
not, however, abrogate the proportional approach employed in Lovett.
5.

Loss of Chance Not Addressed

Three states have yet to rule on or formally address the loss-of-chance
doctrine—Oregon, Utah, and Rhode Island. In Joshi v. Providence
Health System of Oregon Corp., 73 the plaintiff did not argue loss of
chance under the proportional approach, and therefore the Supreme
Court of Oregon declined to rule on whether that would be a cognizable
cause of action in the future. 74 The Joshi Court did hold that loss of
67. 890 N.E.2d 819, 823, 838–41 (Mass. 2008) (adopting the proportional approach).
68. Mass. S.B. 1038.
69. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 507-E:2 (2014).
70. Id. § 507-E:2(III).
71. 770 A.2d 1103, 1106–08 (N.H. 2001).
72. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 42, at 607 n.57 (acknowledging the statute as superseding Lord v.
Lovett).
73. 149 P.3d 1164 (Or. 2006).
74. See id. at 1170 (“We cannot accept plaintiff’s invitation to adopt [the loss of chance] theory
brought under [Oregon’s wrongful death statute].”); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (2012) (“When the
death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative
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chance is incompatible with Oregon’s wrongful death statute. 75
Although the Supreme Court of Utah has never explicitly adopted or
rejected the loss-of-chance doctrine, in Seale v. Gowans 76 the Court
stated in dicta that the loss of chance, without proof of actual damages,
was insufficient to sustain a cause of action. 77 The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island twice refused to accept or reject the loss-of-chance
doctrine. In 2004, the Court stated “[a]lthough we may revisit the lossof-chance doctrine under an appropriate factual scenario, we hold that
for the reasons set forth here the facts presented in this case are
inadequate.” 78 The Court had another opportunity to address the loss-ofchance doctrine in 2008, however it declined to do so because the
physician was found not negligent, and therefore further inquiry into
whether a chance was lost was moot. 79
II.

HISTORY OF THE LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE IN
WASHINGTON

The Washington State Supreme Court first recognized the loss-ofchance doctrine in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget
Sound. 80 The Court then expanded the doctrine to include loss of chance
of a better outcome short of death in Mohr v. Grantham. 81 While Mohr
officially adopted the Herskovits concurrence’s endorsement of the
proportional approach, 82 the doctrine in its present form is incoherent. 83
The Mohr court focused on justifying expanding the doctrine, 84 but
of the decedent . . . may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might have
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the same
act or omission.”).
75. Joshi, 149 P.3d at 1170 (“Although deprivation of a 30 percent chance of survival may
constitute an injury, the injury that is compensable under ORS 30.020 is death.”).
76. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996).
77. Id. at 1365 (holding that the case was barred by the statute of limitations).
78. Contois v. W. Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019, 1025 (R.I. 2004).
79. Madros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 311 (R.I. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that because the loss-ofchance doctrine affects only the causation part of the tort analysis and because the jury never was
required to reach the question of causation, the trial justice’s failure to instruct on the loss-of-chance
doctrine is moot.”).
80. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 619, 664 P.2d 474, 479 (1983).
81. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 857, 262 P.3d 490, 496 (2011).
82. Id.
83. See infra Part II.C.1.
84. See Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 854–56, 262 P.3d at 495 (“To limit Herskovits to cases that result
in death is arbitrary; the same underlying principles of deterring negligence and compensating for
injury apply when the ultimate harm is permanent disability.”).
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failed to address many of the problems the opinion created. 85 Mohr was
almost entirely silent on providing guidance to courts and practitioners
when dealing with a loss of chance claim. 86 Most recently, the
Washington State Court of Appeals for Division III attempted to tackle
many of the problems left behind by Mohr in Estate of Dormaier v.
Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC. 87 However, the Dormaier court only
served to further muddle the doctrine. 88
This Comment will now explore the loss-of-chance doctrine’s
development in Washington. The discussion includes an overview of
each pertinent loss of chance case, followed by an explanation of the
issues remaining or created by each opinion. This Part proceeds
chronologically, beginning with Herskovits v. Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound, 89 and ending with Estate of Dormaier v.
Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC. 90
A.

Herskovits and the Adoption of the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine

In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, a medical
malpractice suit by a plaintiff who died after his physician initially failed
to diagnose the plaintiff’s lung cancer, the Washington State Supreme
Court first adopted loss of chance as a matter of common law. 91 The
Court addressed the issue of whether plaintiff-patient Herskovits—who
had a 39% chance of survival that was reduced to 25%—could maintain
a cause of action against the hospital and its doctors for the negligence
that resulted in a 14% decrease in his chance of survival. 92
Decedent Leslie Herskovits began visiting Group Health Hospital in
early 1974 with lung problems. 93 By December of 1974, he had a
persistent cough and lung pain, but was treated only with cough syrup.94

85. See infra Part II.C.1.
86. See infra Part II.C.1.
87. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013).
88. See infra Part II.D.1.
89. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
90. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013).
91. 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479. Herskovits was the first case to adopt loss of chance in
Washington State; however, Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 293, 545 P.2d 13 (1975),
held that, under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 323, one who negligently renders aid
and increases the risk of harm is liable for damages caused. Brown, 86 Wash. 2d at 299, 545 P.2d at
17–18.
92. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 611, 664 P.2d at 475.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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In the spring of 1975, he saw a private practice physician, who
diagnosed him with lung cancer. 95 In July 1975, Mr. Herskovits had his
lung removed. He died twenty months later. 96
Edith Herskovits, widow and personal representative of Leslie
Herskovits’s estate, brought suit against Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound for failure to timely diagnose her husband’s lung cancer. 97
At the hearing on summary judgment, the plaintiff was unable to show
that the failure to initially diagnose his lung cancer more probably than
not caused his death. 98 Experts, in affidavits, opined that the delayed
diagnosis resulted in a 14% reduction in the decedent’s chances of
survival. 99 The Superior Court for King County employed the traditional
approach and granted summary judgment to the defendant based on the
plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence that the alleged negligence more
probably than not caused the death. 100
In a fractured decision, the Washington State Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether, under Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 323(a), 101 proof that a defendant’s conduct increased the risk of
death by decreasing the chances of survival was sufficient to take the
issue of proximate cause to the jury. 102 In its lead opinion the Court
answered yes, 103 relying on decisions from other jurisdictions 104 that
allowed cases to go to a jury based on evidence that the defendant’s
conduct deprived decedents of a “significant” chance to survive or
recover. 105 The cases that the Court relied on did not require proof to a
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 611–12, 664 P.2d at 475–76.
99. Id. at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
100. See id. at 620–21, 664 P.2d at 480 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed the action, holding that plaintiff had ‘failed to produce expert testimony
which would establish that the decedent probably would not have died on or about March, 1977 but
for the conduct of the defendant.’” (emphasis in original)).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) (“One who undertakes . . . to render
services to another . . . is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of such harm . . . .”).
102. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 613, 664 P.2d at 476 (lead opinion).
103. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476–77.
104. Id. at 625, 664 P.2d at 482 (Pearson, J., concurring) (citing McBride v. United States, 462
F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Hicks v. United States, 368
F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel
Hosp., 357 N.Y.S. 2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)).
105. Id. at 613–14, 664 P.2d at 476–77 (lead opinion).
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degree of “absolute certainty” that the defendant’s actions caused the
injury or death. 106
The Court’s reasoning was two-fold. 107 First, the Court held it was not
for the tortfeasor, “who put the possibility of recovery beyond
realization, to say afterwards that the result was inevitable.”108 Second,
the Court concluded that not allowing such a claim to go forward would
in effect be a “blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals any
time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival, regardless of
how flagrant the negligence.” 109 Departing from traditional tort law,
which requires a “but-for” test for causation, 110 the Court determined the
defendant could still be held liable although the defendant did not cause
the decedent’s lung cancer to initially manifest, but instead failed in a
duty to protect against harm from another source. 111 With that analysis
as the starting point, the jury could then consider whether the increased
risk or decreased chance of recovery was a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm. 112 The plaintiff did not need to present evidence
sufficient to show that the negligence resulted in the harm, but only that
it increased the risk of harm. 113 It would then be for the jury to bridge the
gap between increased risk and causation. 114 Further, the Herskovits
Court held: “[n]o matter how small that chance may have been—and its
magnitude cannot be ascertained—no one can say that the chance of
prolonging one’s life or decreasing suffering is valueless.” 115 Thus, the
lead opinion adopted the substantial factor approach.
The Herskovits Court attempted to address candidly the problems
inherent in the probabilistic nature of its new approach. 116 A criticism of

106. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d 476.
107. Id. at 614–15, 664 P.2d 476–77.
108. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476.
109. Id. at 664 P.2d at 477.
110. Id. at 616, 664 P.2d 477.
111. Id.; see also Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1287–88 (Pa. 1978) (“In order than an actor
is not completely insulated because of uncertainties as to the consequences of his negligent conduct,
section 323(a) tacitly acknowledges this difficulty and permits the issue to go to the jury upon a less
than normal threshold of proof.”).
112. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 617, 664 P.2d at 478.
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1288 (“[S]uch evidence furnishes a basis for the fact-finder
to go further and find that such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing about the
resultant harm.”).
115. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 618, 664 P.2d at 478–79 (emphasis in original) (quoting James v.
United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980)).
116. Id. at 617–18, 664 P.2d at 478.
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the loss-of-chance doctrine is that it is based on speculation and
conjecture. 117 In response to this critique, the Herskovits court stated that
“[w]here percentage probabilities and decreased probabilities are
submitted into evidence, there is simply no danger of speculation on the
part of the jury. More speculation is involved in requiring the medical
expert to testify as to what would have happened had the defendant not
been negligent.” 118
The four-justice concurrence in Herskovits took a different
approach. 119 Of importance was the nature of the injury. 120 The
concurrence determined that if death was the injury, then the standards
for establishing cause in fact in a medical malpractice case, set forth in
O’Donoghue v. Riggs, 121 were not satisfied. 122 The defendant’s
negligence—causing a 14% reduction as opposed to a 51% or greater
reduction in chance—did not more probably than not cause the
decedent’s death. 123 If so, the concurrence wrote that the trial court
decision must be affirmed. 124 To do otherwise would be to “depart
substantially from the traditional requirements of establishing proximate
cause in this type of case.” 125 The concurrence rejected the lead
opinion’s adoption of the substantial factor approach, because this
approach did not comport with the traditional elements of causation in
medical malpractice cases.
However, if the reduced chance of survival in itself is the injury, 126
117. See Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 604–05 (8th Cir. 1970) (rejecting the argument that the
jury’s decision involved “speculation and conjecture”); Férot, supra note 1, at 599–600 (stating that
loss of chance as an injury is often criticized for being a speculative harm).
118. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 618, 664 P.2d at 478; see also Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,
653 (1946) (“It is no answer to say that the jury’s verdict involved speculation and
conjecture . . . . [A] measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose
duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable
inference.”); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 31 (1935) (addressing the
value of a chance).
119. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 619–36, 664 P.2d at 479–86 (Pearson, J., concurring).
120. See id. at 623, 664 P.2d at 481.
121. 73 Wash. 2d 814, 440 P.2d 823 (1968).
122. Id. at 824, 440 P.2d at 830 (“To remove the issue from the realm of speculation, the medical
testimony must at least be sufficiently definite to establish that the act complained of ‘probably’ or
‘more likely than not’ caused the subsequent disability.”).
123. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 623, 664 P.2d at 481 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“Dr. Ostrow
was unable to state that probably, or more likely than not, Mr. Herskovits’s death was caused by
defendant’s negligence.”).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Viewing the lost chance as the injury separates the distinction between causation and
valuation. The question is not “Did the lost chance cause the injury?” but rather, “What is the lost
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then the O’Donoghue test is met. 127 The concurrence relied on the
approach taken in three cases—Jeanes v. Milner, 128 O’Brien v. Stover, 129
and James v. United States. 130 In Jeanes, O’Brien, and James, the
reduction in, or loss of, the chance of survival was the actionable
injury. 131 As such, the defendant was liable only for damages pertaining
to the diminished or lost chance of survival, not for the death itself.132
The concurrence also drew on Joseph King’s article, Causation,
Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting
Conditions and Future Consequences, 133 which advocates for allowing
recovery for a loss of chance, even if the chance of recovery was less
than 50%. 134 To do otherwise—employing the all-or-nothing approach
to recovery—would “[subvert] the deterrence objectives of tort law by
denying recovery for the effects of conduct that causes statistically
demonstrable losses . . . . A failure to allocate the cost of these losses to
their tortious sources . . . strikes at the integrity of the torts system of
loss allocation.” 135 This reasoning is at the heart of the proportional
approach.
Thus, the concurrence found that the loss of a less-than-even chance
on its own is an actionable injury. 136 The claim may be brought by the
decedent’s personal representative 137 via Washington’s wrongful death
statute. 138 Under such a scheme, a person will “cause” someone’s death
if he causes a “substantial reduction in that person’s chance of
chance—the injury—worth?” The all-or-nothing and substantial-factor approaches deal in terms of
causation, whereas the proportional approach, which the Herskovits concurrence adopted, is a
theory of valuation. Id. at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 487.
127. Id. at 624, 664 P.2d at 481.
128. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
129. 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971).
130. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
131. See Stover, 443 F.2d at 1019 (approving damages for patient’s reduced “chances of
survival,” or at least “living longer and more comfortably”); Milner, 428 F.2d at 604–05 (finding
delayed diagnosis of cancer reduced survival rate from 35% to 24%); James, 483 F. Supp. at 587
(“No matter how small that chance may have been—and its magnitude cannot be ascertained—no
one can say that the chance of prolonging one’s life or decreasing suffering is valueless.”).
132. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 632, 664 P.2d at 485–86.
133. 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
134. Id. at 1363–64.
135. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 486–87 (Pearson, J., concurring) (quoting King,
supra note 5, at 1377).
136. Id.
137. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (2012).
138. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 486–87 (Pearson, J., concurring); WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (2012).
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survival.” 139 Again citing King’s article, the concurrence found that
damages for a loss of chance claim would be allocated proportionally,
and a 14% loss of survival acts as 14% liability for a person’s death. 140
In this case, if Herskovits’s estate was successful on its claim, the estate
would recover 14% of what it would have recovered had the defendant
affirmatively caused his death. 141
In sum, the Herskovits lead opinion created relaxed causation
standards in that the “substantial factor” test pertaining to chance lost
need not necessarily be 51% or greater to establish proximate
causation. 142 The concurrence adopted the proportional approach, and
stated that the loss of chance itself is the actionable injury, and
traditional elements of tort law apply. 143 Negligence must be the
proximate cause of the lost chance, not the ultimate outcome. 144
1.

The Lead Opinion’s Adoption of the Substantial Factor Approach
Rewrites Tort Principles of Causation and Is Subject to
Manipulation

The Herskovits majority opinion did not address several issues with
the loss-of-chance doctrine. As pointed out by the dissenting opinion in
Herskovits, allowing a less than 51% loss of chance to go to the jury on
proximate cause upsets traditional notions of tort law. 145 Calculation of
damages is also an issue. The lead opinion states that “[d]amages should
be awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages
caused directly by premature death, such as lost earning and additional
medical expenses, etc.” 146 This language, while intended to soften the
blow, still promotes overcompensating the plaintiff. 147 Based on the
relaxed causation standards, a defendant would be liable for 100% of
139. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 486–87 (Pearson, J., concurring); see also
id. at 635 n.1, 664 P.2d at 487 n.1 (advocating for a liberal construction of the wrongful death
statute because the word “cause” has a “notoriously elusive meaning” and is “flexible” enough to fit
this interpretation).
140. Id. at 635, 664 P.2d at 487; King, supra note 5, at 1382.
141. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 635, 664 P.2d at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring) (stating that
recovery would be the percentage lost times the value of the decedent’s life).
142. Id. at 610–19, 664 P.2d at 474–79 (lead opinion).
143. Id. at 619–636, 664 P.2d at 479–87 (Pearson, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
145. See id. at 639, 664 P.2d at 489 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting) (“Except in situations where
there are coequal causes, however, defendant’s act cannot be a substantial factor when the event
would have occurred without it.”).
146. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (lead opinion).
147. King, supra note 5, at 1368–70.
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future lost earnings and medical expenses based on a 14% reduction of a
chance of survival. 148 Some scholars believe that the relaxed causation
standard overcompensates plaintiffs and holds physicians liable for too
much. 149
Furthermore, the opinion is unclear as to how to calculate the actual
percentage lost. 150 At one point, the court uses 14%, as stipulated by the
parties, which would be the proportional percentage, based on a 100%
expectation of survival scale. 151 Later on, the court moves to a relative
proportional percentage, 152 stating that a reduction from 39% to 25% is a
36% loss of chance. 153 This poses significant problems both in terms of
the substantial factor test and in damages. For example, say Patient A has
a 4% chance of survival, which is reduced to 1%. That is either a 3%
loss of chance, or a 75% loss of chance, depending on which type of
proportionality is applied. Patient B had a 60% chance of survival that
was reduced to 40% because of the defendant’s negligence. The strict
proportional difference would be 20%, and the relative proportional
difference would be 33.3%. Under the all-or-nothing approach, and if
relative proportionality is applied, Patient A might stand to recover the
full amount of damages when the possibility of dying was 96%, while
Patient B would get nothing. However, it takes no stretch of the
imagination to see that Patient B has been more harmed by defendant’s
negligence. Under the proportional approach, Patient A could recover
either 3% or 75%, 154 and Patient B would recover 20% or 33%. Under
the substantial factor approach, both Patient A and B are eligible to
148. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 633, 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring).
149. See e.g., King, supra note 25, at 508 (“[By] relaxing the proof requirements, it increases the
likelihood that a plaintiff will be able to convince a jury to award full damages.”).
150. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 610, 614, 664 P.2d at 474, 476–77 (lead opinion) (stating a 14%
reduction at one point and a 36% reduction later on).
151. Id. at 610, 664 P.2d at 474; King, supra note 5, at 1382.
152. An easy way to distinguish between strict proportional percentage and relative proportional
percentage is the type of math involved. Strict proportional percentage uses simple subtraction. 40%
to 10% is a reduction of 30%. Relative proportional percentage involves a more complicated
equation. If we are taking a reduction in chance from 40% to 10%, we first subtract 10% from 40%,
which leaves us with 30%. The equation then becomes, 30 is what percentage of 40? Or 30 =
40 x / 100. The answer is 75%.
153. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614, 664 P.2d at 476–77.
154. Seventy-five percent recovery is just a theoretical example. As the law in Washington
stands, once the percentage lost exceeds 50%, the loss-of-chance doctrine morphs from the
proportional approach to the all-or-nothing approach. See Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia,
177 Wash. App 828, 850, 313 P.3d 431, 441 (2013) (“As a matter of law, a greater than 50 percent
reduction in the decedent’s chance of survival is the same as proximate cause of the decedent’s
death under traditional tort principles.”) As will be demonstrated, this morphing is one of the
complications arising from using loss of chance as an umbrella term. See infra Part II.D.1.
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recover 100% of damages. However, seeing as how percentages are
manipulable, using relative proportionality makes the lost chance appear
more substantial than it actually is.
2.

Solutions, and Problems, of the Concurrence

The concurrence’s plurality opinion, 155 if followed, solves two of the
lead opinion’s problems. 156 By making the loss of chance the actionable
injury, 157 the concurrence solves the problem of distorting traditional tort
law. 158 Furthermore, the concurrence eliminates the all-or-nothing
approach of the 51% requirement, employs proportional percentages to
the percentage lost as well as damages, and still adequately leaves
plaintiffs with an avenue of redress. 159 However, by saying that the
negligence was not the proximate cause of death, but that it “caused” the
death for purposes of the statute, the concurrence seems to—in theory—
revert to the relaxed causation standard, only via a different route. 160
B.

Loss of Chance Between Herskovits and Mohr

Although unclear following Herskovits, the loss-of-chance doctrine
remained viable from its adoption in 1983 through 2011, when the
Washington State Supreme Court again addressed it in Mohr v.
Grantham. 161 In 1990, the Washington State Court of Appeals for
Division One, in Zueger v. Public Hospital District Number 2, 162 held
that the Herskovits “plurality represents the law on a loss of the chance
of survival.” 163 In 2000, in Shellenbarger v. Brigman 164 the Washington
State Court of Appeals for Division Two held that “Washington
recognizes loss of chance as a compensable injury.” 165 In Shellenbarger,

155. The concurrence, signed by four Justices as opposed to the two-Justice lead opinion, is the
plurality opinion. Therefore, “concurrence” and “plurality” are used interchangeably throughout this
Comment.
156. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 632–35, 664 P.2d at 485–87 (Pearson, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487.
158. Id. (holding that the negligence was a proximate cause, established by expert testimony and
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, of the lost chance).
159. Id. at 635, 664 P.2d at 487.
160. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (2012).
161. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 262 P.3d 490 (2011).
162. 57 Wash. App. 584, 789 P.2d 326 (1990).
163. Id. at 591, 789 P.2d at 329.
164. 101 Wash. App. 339, 3 P.3d 211 (2000).
165. Id. at 348, 3 P.3d at 216.
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the court addressed a 20% reduction in slowing the progression of
decedent’s lung disease initially caused by asbestos. 166 The court found
that it was no different from Herskovits’s lost chance of survival. 167 The
slight deviation from Herskovits—the loss of chance was only to slow
the disease, not a 20% loss of chance of recovery—may have signaled
the beginnings of the expansion found in Mohr. 168 The 2000 version of
Washington Practice appeared to endorse the lead opinion of Herskovits:
“Another exception to the cause in fact requirement is available when
the plaintiff more probably than not would have suffered the injury
complained of, but the defendant’s negligence deprived him of a chance
to avoid the injury.” 169
C.

Mohr and the Expansion of the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine

In 2011, the Washington State Supreme Court revisited the loss-ofchance doctrine in Mohr v. Grantham. 170 This opinion seemed to cure
some of the defects left by Herskovits and expanded the loss-of-chance
doctrine to include the loss of chance of a better outcome not resulting in
death. 171 The plaintiff, Mrs. Mohr, alleged that negligent care led to a
delayed diagnosis of a dissected carotid artery that resulted in permanent
brain damage. 172 Mrs. Mohr and her husband filed suit, claiming the
doctors’ negligence in failing to diagnose and treat her dissected carotid
artery “substantially diminished her chance of recovery.” 173 Plaintiff’s
expert testified that Mrs. Mohr’s treatment violated the standard of care,
and had she received non-negligent treatment, would have had a 50% to
60% chance at a better outcome. 174
Hesitant to expand Herskovits, the Benton County Superior Court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Mohrs did
not show but-for causation. 175 On appeal, the Washington State Supreme

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 345, 3 P.3d at 214.
Id. at 349, 3 P.3d at 216.
Id.
16 DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: TORT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.10, at 110 (2d ed. 2000).
170. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 262 P.3d 490 (2011).
171. See id. at 857, 262 P.3d at 498 (officially adopting the Herskovits concurrence and extending
it to include the loss of a chance of a better outcome short of death).
172. Id. at 847–49, 262 P.3d at 491–92.
173. Id. at 849, 262 P.3d at 492.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 849–50, 262 P.3d at 492–93.
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Court formally adopted the reasoning of the Herskovits concurrence 176
and extended the loss-of-chance doctrine to cases in which the end result
is something short of death. 177 Loss of chance of survival was expanded
to loss of chance of a better outcome. 178
The Court reasoned that “[t]o limit Herskovits to cases that result in
death is arbitrary.” 179 Building on Shellenbarger v. Brigman, 180 which
recognized the “loss of chance as a compensable interest,”181 the Court
noted that the expansion fits within Washington’s statue for medical
malpractice. 182 However, the Court’s reasoning was that “nothing in the
medical malpractice statute precludes a lost chance cause of action,” and
that the chapter did not define “proximate cause” and “injury.” 183
With the loss of chance as the actionable injury, the Mohr formulation
requires a plaintiff to prove duty, breach, and that the breach
proximately caused—not the ultimate outcome 184—but the loss of
chance. 185 In addressing the concern surrounding assessment of
damages, the Court relied on reasoning from a similar loss of chance
case from Massachusetts—Matsuyama v. Birnbaum. 186 The Matsuyama
court concluded that “[s]uch difficulties are not confined to loss of
chance claims. A wide range of medical malpractice cases, as well as
numerous other tort actions, are complex and involve actuarial or other
probabilistic estimates.” 187 Estimates are nothing new as judges and
juries often must decide what the value of a better outcome would be. 188
The Mohr court also adopted the Herskovits concurrence’s method of

176. Id. at 857, 262 P.3d at 496.
177. Id. at 855–56, 262 P.3d at 495–96.
178. Id. at 850–57, 262 P.3d at 493–96.
179. Id. at 856, 262 P.3d at 495.
180. 101 Wash. App. 339, 3 P.3d 211 (2000).
181. Id. at 348, 3 P.3d at 216.
182. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 856, 262 P.3d at 496; WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012).
183. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 856, 262 P.3d at 496; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.70.020, 7.70.040.
184. The “ultimate outcome” refers to the end result, not the lost chance. For example, if a
patient’s chance of surviving a type of cancer is reduced from 40% to 20%, and the patient dies, the
ultimate outcome is death. However the actionable injury would be the lost chance, not the death.
See, e.g., Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 857, 262 P.3d at 496 (distinguishing between the lost chance as the
compensable injury and the ultimate outcome).
185. Id.
186. 890 N.E. 2d 819 (Mass. 2008).
187. Id. at 833.
188. See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929) (holding that the court had to
determine the value of a 100% perfect hand).
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calculating damages—the proportional damages approach. 189 This
damages calculation technique alleviated the Herskovits lead opinion’s
potential problem of whether to apply relative or proportional
percentages. 190
Finally, Mohr held true to the principal rationale of Herskovits—that
to not recognize a loss of chance would be a blanket release of liability
for anyone who had less than a 51% chance of survival or avoiding
injury or disability, no matter how egregious the negligence. 191
The Mohr opinion solved some of the problems left behind by
Herskovits. First, in rejecting the Herskovits lead opinion, the holding in
Mohr clarifies that Washington is not adopting a relaxed theory of
causation. 192 By explicitly holding that the loss of chance is the
actionable injury, although it in effect created a new class of plaintiffs,
the Court brought the loss-of-chance doctrine back into the traditional
confines of tort law, which require a plaintiff to prove that a defendant
more likely than not caused her injury. 193 Now, the negligence must be
the “but-for” and proximate cause of the patient’s lost chance of a better
outcome, not the ultimate outcome itself. 194 Second, the damages
scheme is fairer to medical practitioners than the Herskovits lead
opinion’s damages calculation method because the Court adopted the
concurrence and rejected the relaxation of the “substantial factor” test.195
Under the lead opinion of Herskovits, it is possible that a defendant
could be liable for 100% of damages for causing 14% of the harm. 196 By
adopting the proportional damages approach, the court curbed the
possibility of overcompensating plaintiffs while ensuring that
legitimately aggrieved plaintiffs get their day in court.
1.

Uncertainty After Mohr: The Problems of Expanding a Doctrine
Without Providing Guidance on Its Application in Practice

While Mohr solved one problem of Herskovits, it resolved little of the
uncertainty regarding this doctrine. In fact, the Mohr decision presented
189. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 858–59, 262 P.3d at 496–97.
190. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 610–19, 664 P.2d 474,
474–79 (1983).
191. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 855–58, 262 P.3d at 495–97.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 858–59, 262 P.3d at 496–97.
196. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 610–19, 664 P.2d 474,
474–79 (1983).
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more questions than answers. All the Mohr court effectively held was
the adoption of the Herskovits concurrence and the extension of loss of
chance to include loss of chance of a better outcome. The problems
implicated by the decision, yet left unaddressed, are principally what this
Comment attempts to resolve.
a.

When Is the Loss of Chance Argument Appropriate?

The plaintiffs in Mohr argued a loss of a 50% to 60% chance at a
better outcome. 197 The Mohr opinion’s main focus was on whether or
not to extend the doctrine to include the loss of a chance of a better
outcome, 198 but did not address the fact that, under the Herskovits
concurrence, which the Mohr court officially adopted, a loss of chance
over 51% qualifies as proximate causation. 199 Can one have a greater
than 51% loss of chance that does not qualify as proximate cause of the
end result? The Court was silent on this matter.
Furthermore, what must the starting percentage be? If an analysis
starts at 50% or less, the lost chance will always be less than 51%. But
what if the starting percentage is 85% and the ending percentage is 60%,
a 25% loss of chance? The patient had a better than even chance of a
good outcome pre- and post- negligence, but the lost chance was less
than 50%. And what if the patient, pre-negligence, had a 60% chance of
survival, and post-negligence had a 40% chance of survival? The
plaintiff has gone from more likely than not going to survive, to more
likely than not going to die. The evidence presented in Mohr was for a
50% to 60% lost chance, 200 but the opinion did not explain whether 50%
to 60% was the starting percentage, or whether 50% to 60% was the total
percentage lost and the starting percentage is irrelevant because the 50%
threshold of lost chance is met. In short, Mohr gives no guidance as to
whether—in order to claim a loss of chance—the starting percentage
must be 50% or less, or the total chance lost must be 50% or less.
b.

What Evidence Is Necessary to Satisfy the Burden of Proof?

The Mohr court provides little guidance about the evidentiary
standards necessary to satisfy the burden of proof for a loss of chance
claim. The Court states that “[t]o prove causation, a plaintiff would then

197.
198.
199.
200.

Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 849, 262 P.3d at 492.
Id. at 850, 262 P.3d at 493.
Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 631, 664 P.2d at 485 (Pearson, J., concurring).
Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 860, 262 P.3d at 497.
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rely on established tort causation doctrines permitted by law and the
specific evidence of the case.” 201 We are told that “calculation of a loss
of chance . . . is based on expert testimony, which in turn is based on
significant practical experience and ‘on data obtained and analyzed
scientifically . . . as part of the repertoire of diagnosis and treatment, as
applied to the specific facts of the plaintiff’s case.’” 202 However, what
the ‘specific facts’ are remains unclear. In a given loss of chance case,
the establishing causation may be a two-step process. For example,
assume a patient is misdiagnosed with cancer. At the time of the
misdiagnosis, it is alleged the patient was at stage I and had a 40%
chance of survival. Two years later, the patient is diagnosed with stage
III cancer and the patient’s chance of survival is 10%. In order to prove
causation of the lost chance, must the experts testify only to the chances
of survival at each stage of cancer? Or must the experts also
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the patient was in
fact at stage I when the misdiagnosis occurred? 203
c.

Must the Ultimate Outcome Occur?

In both Herskovits and Mohr, the ultimate outcomes transpired. 204
This makes the lost chance relevant, and provides a basis for calculating
damages—the ultimate outcome. But if the injury is the lost chance, and
not the ultimate outcome, what happens in cases when a plaintiff loses a
significant chance at a better outcome, yet the outcome does not or has
not yet come to pass? Is the claim still actionable? How would damages
be calculated? How does the doctrine anticipate and account for possible
future harm that may never come to pass? These questions were left
unraised and unanswered by the Court.
d.

Do Mohr and Herskovits Govern Different Types of Loss of
Chance Cases?
Mohr adopted the Herskovits concurrence, 205 but does that mean

201. Id. at 862, 262 P.3d at 499.
202. Id. at 857–58, 262 P.3d at 496 (quoting Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 833
(Mass. 2008)).
203. See e.g., Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 2013) (finding that the expert
concluded cancer had not metastasized at time of misdiagnosis, but was at Stage III or IV when
finally diagnosed).
204. See Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 849, 262 P.3d at 492 (plaintiff permanently brain damaged);
Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 611, 664 P.2d at 475 (plaintiff died).
205. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 857, 262 P.3d at 496.
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Mohr now governs loss of chance cases in which the end result is death?
Is Herskovits still good law? And if so, does Mohr dictate that the
Herskovits concurrence applies to wrongful death cases, and Mohr to
loss of chance of a better outcome cases? While it may intuitively seem
that Mohr applies to all loss of chance cases, it is not clear. Mohr was
cabined in the medical malpractice statute,206 and Herskovits in the
wrongful death statute. 207 How are these to be reconciled? This
confusion is highlighted in the Dormaier opinion, discussed in Part II.D.
e.

When Must Loss of Chance Be Pleaded?

Must loss of chance be pleaded in the initial complaint? Or is it
enough for a plaintiff to present evidence of a lost chance to receive the
jury instruction? If a defendant presents expert testimony to the effect
that the lost chance was a very small percentage, as an affirmative
defense, has it just argued itself into a lost chance jury instruction for the
plaintiff?
f.

Is Loss of Chance Statutory?

As addressed by the Mohr dissent, the loss of chance of a better
outcome does not conform to the medical malpractice statute. 208 Forcing
it into the statute—even though “injury,” as used in the statute, can be
used to mean the loss of a chance—runs the risk of confusing the lost
chance with proximate causation for the ultimate outcome. It does not
belong in the statute, just as Justice Pearson’s notion of “causation” did
not bring loss of chance into the wrongful death statute. 209 It is, in
essence, rewriting the statute, and creating a potential source of
confusion.

206. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012) (providing that a plaintiff must establish breach and
causation) (“(1) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning
expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider . . . ; and (2) Such failure was a proximate
cause of the injury complained of”).
207. Id. § 4.20.010 (“When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or
default of another his or her personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the
person causing the death . . . .”).
208. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 868, 262 P.3d at 501 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legislature
meant an actual physical disability resulting from the failure to exercise proper care, not an
amorphous ‘lost chance’ that may well involve no actual disability at all.”); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.70.040.
209. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 634–35, 664 P.2d 486–
87 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring).

20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]
g.

6/6/2014 12:23 PM

LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE

629

What Is the Conjunction Principle and When Should It Be Used?

The Mohr opinion mentions the conjunction principle 210 in a citation
parenthetical, as a way to mitigate percentage lost in the face of
uncertainty. 211 Specifically the Court states that “[w]here appropriate,
[the lost chance percentage] may otherwise be discounted for margins of
error to further reflect the uncertainty of outcome even with a
nonnegligent standard of care.” 212 However the Court does not define
the conjunction principle, or provide guidance as to when it would be
appropriate to apply it.
D.

Estate of Dormaier and Its Application of Mohr and Herskovits

The most recent case to tackle the loss-of-chance doctrine was Estate
of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC. 213 This Washington
State Court of Appeals case concerned a patient who had died from a
pulmonary embolism that detached from her hip during surgery. 214 The
complaint alleged that Mrs. Dormaier “died as a proximate result of the
negligence of the Defendants” and “sustained injuries and damages and
died due to the negligence of Defendants.” 215 At trial, Plaintiff presented
expert witnesses who testified that, had the pulmonary embolus been
detected, the patient would have had a 90% chance of surviving. 216 The
experts stated that the misdiagnoses reduced Mrs. Dormaier’s chances of
survival by 50% to 90%. 217 At the close of trial, the plaintiffs requested a
jury instruction on the decedent’s lost chance of survival, which the trial
court granted because both sides had addressed loss of chance in their
210. The conjunction principle takes into account possible or known discrepancies in percentage.
Depending on the facts, it can be used by either plaintiff or defendant. For example, if the lost
chance is 30%, and the probability that the plaintiff was at the proposed starting percentage was
80%, the total lost chance would be 30% times 80%, or 24%. In that instance, the defendant is using
the conjunction principle to mitigate the proportional damages. However, if the total lost chance
was 50%, and the probability that the plaintiff was at the proposed starting percentage was 40%
(thus not meeting the preponderance of the evidence standard to show causation for the lost chance).
The conjunction principle could be applied to circumvent proximate cause, i.e., 50% times 40%
equals a 20% total lost chance, even though the burden of proving causation has not been met. The
conjunction principle, in some ways, can be seen as a sort of proportional approach twice applied.
See King, supra note 25, at 554–56 (explaining the conjunction principle).
211. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 858, 262 P.3d at 497.
212. Id. (citing King, supra note 25, at 554–56).
213. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013).
214. Id. at 836–38, 313 P.3d at 434–35.
215. Id. at 838, 313 P.3d at 435.
216. Id. at 839, 313 P.3d at 435–36.
217. Id.
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cases. 218 In a special verdict, the jury returned the following responses:
(1) the defendant was negligent; (2) the defendant’s negligence was not
the proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s death; (3) the defendant’s
negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s lost chance of
survival; and (4) the percentage lost was 70%. 219 Defendants sought a
directed verdict based on the inconsistency between answers two and
four. 220 In other words, because Mohr and the Herskovits concurrence
made loss of chance a separate and distinct injury, the defendants
contended that the plaintiffs should not be able to argue a 50% loss of
chance to get the jury instruction for loss of chance, and then use it to
circumvent proximate cause for the ultimate outcome. The trial court
concluded that the two entries were not irreconcilable, because “[i]t
was . . . not inconsistent with the jury’s rejection of negligence as a
proximate cause of the death itself, for the jury to consider the
percentage by which negligence diminished Mrs. Dormaier’s chance to
survive the death-causing event.” 221 Defendants also asked that the
award be limited to 70% of the damages because the jury did not find
proximate cause of the death, but only the 70% loss of chance. 222 The
trial court refused, concluding
[h]ad the jury found that the diminution of chance to survive
was less than 50%, then the court would have been required to
reduce the jury’s finding of damages by that figure. However,
where the reduction in chance to survive is itself found to be
greater than 50%, it becomes, as a matter of law, a concurrent
proximate cause of the death . . . . 223
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered: 1) whether a plaintiff
may argue the lost chance doctrine if the chance lost was greater than
50%; (2) whether plaintiffs must plead loss of chance as a separate cause
of action; (3) whether the special verdict answers were irreconcilable;
and (4) whether damages should be reduced to 70% of the total award. 224
As to the first issue, the court looked back at Herskovits and Mohr,
and concluded “a plaintiff may not argue the lost chance doctrine where
the defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s chance of survival by

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 840–41, 313 P.3d at 436.
Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437.
Id.
Id. at 843, 313 P.3d at 437.
Id.
Id. at 843–44, 313 P.3d at 437–38.
Id. at 844–70, 313 P.3d at 438–51.
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greater than 50 percent.” 225 Because the lost chance presented was 50%
to 90%—with 50% being the threshold percentage—arguing loss of
chance was appropriate. 226
On the second issue, appellants argued that not pleading lost chance
of survival as a separate cause of action was inconsistent with Mohr and
violated Superior Court Civil Rule 8, 227 which states, in part, “[a]
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” 228 The court disagreed, citing Herskovits’s recognizing loss of
chance as an “actionable injury” and that “a person will ‘cause’ the death
of another person (within the meaning of Revised Code of Washington
4.20.010) whenever he causes a substantial reduction in that person’s
chance of survival.” 229 The court then went on to say “the Mohr court
reaffirmed a lost chance of survival is fundamentally an alternative
manner of proving wrongful death causation, available solely where the
defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s chance of survival by less
than or equal to 50 percent.” 230 Because the Mohr Court did not decide
how to classify a loss of chance for Civil Rule 8 pleading purposes, the
Dormaier court concluded that it was not intended that loss of chance be
considered a separate cause of action. 231 Because wrongful death was the
theory upon which the plaintiff’s sought relief, whether or not the
complaint pleaded the lost chance was irrelevant. 232
The third issue deals with the fact that the jury, on question four,
answered that defendant’s negligence caused a 70% loss of chance of
survival. 233 Yet, for question two, the jury answered that defendant’s
negligence was not a proximate cause of her death. 234 The lost chance
instruction read, “[i]f you find that the loss or diminution of a chance to
survive was in excess of 50%, then you have found that such negligence
was a proximate cause of the death.” 235 The court reasoned that the two
225. Id. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 853–57, 313 P.3d at 442–44; WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 8 (2013).
228. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 853–55, 313 P.3d at 442–43. The Court went on state that
“[w]e construe a complaint liberally so as to do substantial justice.” Id. at 866, 313 P.3d at 449.
229. Id. at 854–55, 313 P.3d at 440 (quoting Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99
Wash. 2d 609, 634–35, 664 P.2d 487 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring)).
230. Id. at 854, 313 P.3d at 443.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 856–57, 313 P.3d at 444.
233. Id. at 867, 313 P.3d at 449.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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answers could be harmonized because “a lost chance of survival is an
actionable injury distinct from death . . . the jury could generally find
proximate cause of the former without finding proximate cause of the
latter.” 236 In light of the jury instruction, the court held that “writing
‘70%’ in answer 4 had the same legal effect as writing ‘Yes’ in answer
2.” 237
In analyzing the fourth issue, whether the damages award should be
reduced to 70%, the court’s reasoning was two-fold. 238 First, the court
referred to its analysis regarding the inconsistent jury verdict, holding
that the special verdict had the same legal effect as if the jury decided
the negligence was the proximate cause of decedent’s death. 239 Second,
the court cited the Herskovits Court’s reasoning for adopting loss of
chance—that it did not want “a blanket release from liability for doctors
and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of
survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence” 240—and decided that
the “rationale is [not] furthered by reducing recovery where the
defendant’s negligence proximately caused the decedent’s death.”241
1.

The Dormaier Opinion Exemplifies the Doctrinal Incoherence that
Plagues the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine

The Dormaier decision is an excellent example of the doctrinal
incoherence that accompanies loss of chance. While the Dormaier
decision points out many of the problems inherent in the loss-of-chance
doctrine, 242 it does little in the way of solving them, and possibly further
complicates the doctrine. The main issue is that throughout the opinion,
three different approaches to the loss-of-chance doctrine are employed—
the substantial factor approach, 243 the proportional approach, 244 and the
all-or-nothing approach. 245 There is a tendency for the court to confuse
causation principles with valuation principles. This begins with a
236. Id.
237. Id. at 868, 313 P.3d at 449–50.
238. Id. at 868–70, 313 P.3d at 450–51.
239. Id. at 868–69, 313 P.3d at 450.
240. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 614, 664 P.2d 474, 477
(1983).
241. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 870, 313 P.3d at 451.
242. See id. at 843–44, 313 P.3d 437–38 (identifying appellants’ arguments that were based on
uncertainty in the doctrine).
243. See supra Part I.A.1.
244. See supra Part I.A.2.
245. See supra Part I.A.3.
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misinterpretation of the Herskovits concurrence, and culminates in
inconsistent application of Herskovits and Mohr.
The first problem is the misinterpretation of Herskovits. The court in
Dormaier states that “[b]y reconceptualizing the decedent’s injury as a
reduction in his chance to survive his death-causing condition, the
plurality concluded the plaintiff could now prove wrongful death
causation in the form of a reduced chance of survival by a ‘probably’ or
‘more likely than not’ standard.” 246 It then went on to conclude that
the Herskovits plurality and Mohr court intended the lost chance
doctrine to reconceptualize the decedent’s injury and aid the
plaintiff in proving wrongful death causation solely where the
plaintiff cannot do so under traditional tort principles, that is,
where the defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s chance
of survival by less than or equal to 50 percent. 247
This is incorrect. The lost chance is the injury itself; it is not a way to
prove causation. 248 This misconception is understandable, given that the
Herskovits concurrence stated in one brief paragraph that the loss of
chance injury may be brought under Washington’s wrongful death
statute. 249 Yet the Dormaier court interprets this principle in a way that
makes it identical in all but name to the “substantial factor” approach of
the Herskovits lead opinion. 250 As noted earlier in this Comment, 251 one
of the shortfalls of the Herskovits’s concurrence was that it tried to force
the loss of chance injury into the wrongful death statute. This is an
accurate representation of why forcing the lost chance into the wrongful
death statute is problematic.
The Dormaier court’s interpretation is incorrect for two reasons.
First, reading it as the Dormaier court does, the Herskovits’s
concurrence is no different than the lead opinion, in that both would
246. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 849, 313 P.3d at 440 (quoting Herskovits v. Grp. Health
Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 632–34, 664 P.2d 485–86 (1983)).
247. Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441.
248. Compare Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 624, 664 P.2d at 481 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“[I]f we
perceive the death of Mr. Herskovits as the injury in this case, we must affirm the trial court . . . . If,
on the other hand, we view the injury to be the reduction of Mr. Herskovits’s chance of survival, our
analysis might well be different.”), with id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487 (“[T]he best resolution of the
issue before us is to recognize the loss of a less than even chance as an actionable injury.”), and
Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 859, 262 P.3d at 497 (“[W]e hold that . . . the injury is the lost chance.”).
249. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“I would
interpret the wrongful death statute, RCW 4.20.010, to apply to cases of this type. Under this
interpretation, a person will ‘cause’ the death of another person (within the meaning of RCW
4.20.010) whenever he causes a substantial reduction in that person’s chance of survival.”).
250. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 849, 313 P.3d at 440.
251. See supra Part II.A.1.

20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 12:23 PM

634

[Vol. 89:603

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

employ the “substantial factor” approach to prove causation, even if the
lost chance is less than even. As pointed out in Mohr, the Herskovits
court was “divided by different reasoning” 252 and “the lead and plurality
opinions split over how, not whether, to recognize a cause of action.” 253
Second, interpreting the concurrence in this way makes its adoption of
proportional damages moot. Employing the “substantial factor”
approach, as the lead opinion does, results in full damages regardless of
the percentage of chance lost, provided the jury concluded the lost
chance was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. 254 The
Herskovits concurrence adopted the “proportional” approach, and the
lead opinion advocated for the “substantial factor” approach. The two
are not reconcilable. 255
This misinterpretation explains why the Dormaier court classified the
loss-of-chance doctrine under three separate approaches. This highlights
the problem with the loss-of-chance doctrine perfectly: it can mean three
different things depending on how it is applied to a certain set of facts. 256
The next potential issue raised by Dormaier is when the loss of
chance argument may be made.257 Accurately noting that the Mohr court
did not specify “whether the plaintiff could argue the lost chance
doctrine upon the 51 to 60 percent figures as well as the 50 percent
figure,” 258 the court went on to hold that “a plaintiff may not argue the
lost chance doctrine where the defendant’s negligence reduced the
decedent’s chance of survival by greater than 50 percent.”259 Important

252. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 851, 262 P.3d at 493.
253. Id. at 852, 262 P.3d at 494.
254. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (lead opinion).
255. Compare id. (“[R]eduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient
evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury.”), with id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487
(Pearson, J., concurring) (“The family of the decedent should also be allowed to maintain an action
for the lost chance of recovery by the decedent.”).
256. See Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441(highlighting the substantial factor
approach) (“We conclude the Herskovits plurality and Mohr court intended the lost chance doctrine
to reconceptualize the decedent’s injury and aid the plaintiff in proving wrongful death causation
solely where the plaintiff cannot do so under traditional tort principles . . . .”); id. at 851, 313 P.3d at
441 (highlighting the proportional approach) (“[W]here the defendant’s negligence reduced the
decedent’s chance of survival by less than or equal to 50 percent, the loss of a chance is the injury
and the plaintiff receives proportional compensation under the lost chance doctrine . . . .”); id.
(highlighting the all-or-nothing approach) (“[W]here the defendant’s negligence reduced the
decedent’s chance of survival by greater than 50 percent, as a matter of law, the death remains the
injury and the plaintiff receives all-or-nothing recovery under traditional tort principles.”).
257. Id. at 844–45, 313 P.3d at 438.
258. Id. at 849–50, 313 P.3d at 441.
259. Id. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441.
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to that determination was the fact that once the lost chance is greater
than 50%, death, or the adverse outcome is the injury as a matter of
law. 260 On its face, the Dormaier opinion appears to advocate for
applying the “proportional approach” when the lost chance is 50% or
less, and the “all-or-nothing approach” when the lost chance is greater
than 50%. 261 This seems simple enough, however, that the court uses the
term “loss of chance” to represent two distinct injuries. One injury is the
lost chance, the other injury is the ultimate outcome. The two injuries are
separate and distinct.
The holding in Dormaier seems to create an incentive for plaintiffs’
attorneys to elicit expert testimony in which the lower threshold of the
lost chance always includes 50%. An analysis of how Dormaier played
out at the trial level reveals this clear incentive. In Dormaier, loss of
chance was not included in the pleadings, 262 however the jury instruction
on loss of chance was allowed because the plaintiff argued a loss of
chance from 50% to 90%. 263 According to the holding, however, the
plaintiff would not have been able to request a loss of chance jury
instruction had the 50% or less threshold not been met. 264 Yet, based on
the special verdict responses, the lost chance instruction is what
eventually enabled the trial court to award full damages to the plaintiff
even though the jury decided that the defendant’s negligence was not the
proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s death. 265 It is possible, therefore,
that had the plaintiff not argued a 50% loss of chance, and thus not been
given the lost chance jury instruction, the plaintiff would have lost the
case. The jury concluded that there was a 70% loss of chance, but not
proximate cause for the death, and the court imputed proximate cause
based on the percentage of lost chance. 266 The appellate court approved
the “all-or-nothing” approach to the lost chance even after arguing that
lost chance may only be argued when the chance lost is less than 50%.267
In addition, this reasoning creates an untenable position for the
defense. The court allowed the loss of chance jury instruction because
there was testimony to the effect that the lost chance could have been

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 853, 313 P.3d at 442.
Id. at 849–57, 313 P.3d at 441–44.
Id. at 849–50, 313 P.3d at 441.
Id. at 868–70, 313 P.3d at 450–51.
Id.
Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441.
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50%. 268 By this rationale, a defendant would open herself up to a new
cause of action and distinct injury if the defendant argued that plaintiff
only lost a chance of 50% or less. The plaintiff might be arguing for
proximate cause of the ultimate outcome, but now loss of chance will be
allowed to come into the equation based on an affirmative defense.
Of course it is easy to say that a lost chance under 50% requires the
proportional approach, and a lost chance over 50% requires the all-ornothing approach. But then there is one distinct injury morphing into a
second separate and distinct injury. And when a plaintiff’s attorney
argues a lost chance of 50% to 90%, the judge, jury, and opposing
counsel must juggle two distinct theories of recovery under the same
name. This confusion demonstrates the need for clarification
surrounding the loss-of-chance doctrine.
Finally, the Dormaier court, depending on which issue it is
addressing, uses conflicting reasoning. For example, in reconciling the
jury’s verdict, the court found that “[b]ecause a lost chance of survival is
an actionable injury distinct from death, the jury could generally find
proximate cause of the former without finding proximate cause of the
latter.” 269 The court is saying that a jury can find proximate cause of a
70% loss of chance, but not proximate cause of the ultimate outcome.
Yet it also stated that “[l]ogic compels our conclusion because where the
loss is greater than 50 percent, no ‘separate and distinguishable harm’
exists.” 270 Furthermore, in reasoning why lost chance need not be
pleaded, the court held “[n]othing suggests the Mohr court intended to
set the loss of a chance apart as an autonomous cause of action, claim, or
ground for relief,” and “wrongful death remained the legal theory upon
which respondents sought relief. Thus it is immaterial whether the
complaint expressly named the lost chance injury.” 271
In its reasoning for approving the lost chance instruction, the court
held that when the defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s
chance of survival by more than 50%, death remains the injury and the
plaintiff receives all-or-nothing recovery under tort principles. 272 So is
the court then saying a jury may find proximate cause for the lost
chance—but not the death or ultimate outcome—and if it finds
268. Id.
269. Id. at 867, 313 P.3d at 449 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court, by reconciling the
verdict, effectively imputed on the jury a finding of both. Id.
270. Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441 (emphasis added) (quoting Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash. 2d 254,
261, 704 P.2d 600, 605 (1985)).
271. Id. at 855–56, 313 P.3d at 443–44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441.
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proximate cause for the lost chance over 50%, the court will impute
proximate causation for the ultimate outcome? This shifts loss of chance
from a theory of valuation to a theory of causation, and the separating
line is difficult to distinguish.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO CLARIFY THE LOSS-OF-CHANCE
DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON
As has been demonstrated, in Washington loss of chance is an
umbrella term that papers over a doctrinal incoherence. It is possible,
and even necessary, that the issue will return to the state Supreme Court.
If and when it does, this Comment proposes the following clarifications
that will both make loss of chance easier for juries, practitioners, and
judges to understand and apply, and will be equitable to both plaintiffs
and defendants alike. Because the Washington State Supreme Court has
made it clear that the loss of chance is the actionable injury, distinct
from the ultimate outcome, 273 adopting the proportional approach
regardless of the percentage is appropriate. Furthermore, this Comment’s
suggestions on evidentiary admissibility and pleading requirements
comport with current Washington law.
A.

The Court Should Exclusively Adopt the Proportional Approach,
Regardless of the Percentage Lost

Currently in Washington, the loss-of-chance doctrine is used to
represent the proportional approach for lost chances of 50% or fewer, 274
and it is used to represent the all-or-nothing approach for lost chances of
51% or higher. 275 The Dormaier decision is an excellent example of this.
The problem is that the court is asking the jurors to keep straight in their
heads two distinct theories of lost chance, but the court labels them
under the same title. The two theories require the application and
evaluation of two distinct proximate causes. For the proportional
approach, proximate cause must be established as to the lost chance. 276
For the all-or-nothing approach, proximate cause must be shown for the
273. See Mohr v. Grantham, 172 Wash. 2d 844, 857, 262 P.3d 490, 498 (2011) (“[T]he loss of
chance is the compensable injury.”).
274. See Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441 (concluding that Herskovits and
Mohr intended loss of chance to be argued only when the lost chance was 50% or less).
275. See id. (finding that the reduction of a greater than 50% chance of recovery constitutes
proximate cause for the injury itself).
276. See Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 857, 262 P.3d at 496 (holding that plaintiff must show breach of
duty proximately caused the lost chance of a better outcome).
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ultimate outcome. 277 For example, if the plaintiff argues a lost chance of
50%–90%, the jury is considering proximate cause for the lost chance of
50% and the injury is the lost chance. But at 51%, the injury morphs
from the lost chance to the ultimate outcome, and the proximate cause
shifts from the lost chance to the ultimate outcome even though it is still
labeled a lost chance. This is difficult at times for judges and
practitioners to keep straight, let alone jurors with no legal education.
Loss of chance should adhere to a single approach. The havoc of
utilizing three, or even two, of the approaches was made clear in the
Dormaier decision. 278 The Supreme Court must decide whether loss of
chance should be brought under the “substantial factor,” “proportional,”
or “all-or-nothing” approach, and only that approach.
This Comment advocates for the “proportional” approach. This author
remains persuaded by the Herskovits Court’s reasoning: “To decide
otherwise would be a blanket release from liability for doctors and
hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival,
regardless of how flagrant the negligence.” 279 However, this Comment
advocates for a proportional approach that encompasses any lost chance,
where the lost chance—whatever the percentage—is the injury, and
damages can be calculated proportionally. The Dormaier court admitted
this approach is logical, yet left the task to the Supreme Court or
legislature. 280
As the jury in Dormaier demonstrated, it is possible to find that a
doctor’s negligence may reduce a patient’s chances of a better outcome
by greater than 50%, but still not be the cause in fact of the ultimate
outcome. 281 It is important to distinguish the lost chance and the ultimate
outcome as two separate and distinct injuries. This Comment proposes
the adoption of only the proportional approach. Any time loss of chance
is argued, because it is a separate and distinct injury from the ultimate
outcome, it will be its own cause of action. And even if the lost chance is
51% or greater, regardless of the starting point, damages will still be
applied proportionally. If the plaintiff wants to prove proximate cause
for the ultimate outcome, that is fine. The plaintiff is free to argue both,

277. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 631, 664 P.2d 474
(1983) (Pearson, J., concurring) (noting that a lost chance of greater than 50% satisfies proximate
cause for the ultimate injury).
278. See Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441.
279. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614, 664 P.2d at 477 (lead opinion).
280. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441.
281. Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437 (noting that the jury found the defendant reduced chances of
survival by 70%, but was not the proximate cause of death).
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but the plaintiff should not argue a loss of a 51% or greater chance to
prove proximate cause for the ultimate outcome. If the jury decides there
is proximate cause for the ultimate outcome, the lost chance argument is
mooted. If, however, the jury finds that the defendant’s negligence
caused a reduction in the chance for a better outcome, no matter the
percentage, the plaintiff will still have an avenue of redress, and
proportional damages will apply.
B.

Evidentiary Standards in a Loss of Chance Case Should Be Stricter

Loss of chance should be proven by traditional tort standards—duty,
breach, causation, and damages. 282 The burden of proof is by a
preponderance of the evidence,283 and the evidence will almost always
require expert testimony. First, the doctor must owe the patient a duty. 284
In the medical malpractice context, there generally must be a physicianpatient relationship, 285 or at the least a duty of a health care professional
to follow the accepted standard of care.286 Second, the plaintiff bears the
burden to show that the defendant breached that duty by failing to
conform to the standard of care. 287 Loss of chance cases typically
involve a misdiagnosis. 288 However, a misdiagnosis in and of itself is not
evidence of negligence.289 Rather, the doctor must behave negligently in
arriving at the wrong diagnosis. 290 This must be proven through expert
testimony establishing the standard of care and how it was breached and

282. See Koch, supra note 42, at 602 (describing necessary tort standards in a medical
malpractice case); Férot, supra note 1, at 595 (listing traditional elements of negligence).
283. See Koch, supra note 42, at 602.
284. See, e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS §§ 8.01–8.05 (1996)
(discussing duty in negligence cases).
285. See Doyle v. Planned Parenthood, 31 Wash. App. 126, 129, 639 P.2d 240, 242 (1982) (“A
wrongful act cannot occur after the termination of the physician-patient relationship.”).
286. See Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs., Inc., 97 Wash. App. 462, 467, 984 P.2d 436, 438 (1999)
(“[A] claim of failure to follow the accepted standard of care does not require a physician-patient
relationship.”). This can be misinterpreted to mean that a physician-patient relationship is not
required to impose a duty on a physician. However, Eelbode stands for the fact that one need not be
a “physician” to commit medical malpractice. A physical therapist, as was the case in Eelbode, is
not a physician, and does not have a physician-patient relationship; yet a duty still exists. Id.
287. See DIAMOND, supra note 284, at § 8.02 (noting that plaintiff must show breach and
causation in addition to duty).
288. See Koch, supra note 42, at 603–04 (using medical misdiagnoses for each example).
289. See Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 327, 622 P.2d 1246, 1259 (1980)
(holding that a wrong diagnosis by itself is not negligence).
290. See id. (holding that the doctor must have breached the standard of care in arriving at the
misdiagnosis).
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how that breach led to the misdiagnosis. 291 Third, the plaintiff must
prove “but-for” cause and effect between the tortious conduct and the
lost chance. 292 But for the defendant’s negligence, the condition would
have been diagnosed. Or to phrase it more simply, if the doctor was not
negligent, he or she would have made the correct diagnosis. Fourth, the
tortious conduct must have been a proximate cause of the lost chance.293
This principle can be described as the lost chance being within the
foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence, 294 and thus asks:
if a wrong diagnosis is made in this situation, is it foreseeable that the
patient will lose a chance at achieving a better outcome? If the trier of
fact answers no, then the plaintiff’s cause of action fails. If it answers
yes, then causation is proven for the lost chance but not, however, for the
ultimate outcome. Finally, the plaintiff must suffer compensable
harm. 295 The compensable harm will be dealt with in more detail in Part
IV.C.
Perhaps the most important factor in adhering to the above standards
is the judge’s role as gatekeeper for the admission of expert testimony.
Although Washington criminal courts have accepted the Frye 296 test, 297
Washington civil courts have neither expressly adopted the Frye test, nor
have they expressly rejected the Daubert 298 test for the admission of
expert testimony. 299 The Washington State Supreme Court held that
“[e]vidence must be probative and relevant, and meet the appropriate
standard of probability.” 300 And while the Frye test has not been
officially adopted in civil cases, “scientific evidence must satisfy the
Frye requirement that the theory and technique or methodology relied
291. See Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wash. 2d 26, 33, 666 P.2d 351, 356 (1983) (noting that expert
testimony is required for matters involving medical science).
292. See DIAMOND, supra note 284, at §§ 11.01–11.04 (discussing cause-in-fact).
293. See id. § 12.01 (giving an overview of proximate cause).
294. See id. § 12.03 (explaining different proximate cause tests).
295. See id. § 3.01 (providing an overview of negligence).
296. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring that there must be
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the theory proffered by the expert).
297. See Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d 593, 602, 260 P.3d 857, 861
(2011) (“Washington courts, at least in criminal cases, have long adopted the Frye ‘general
acceptance’ standard.”).
298. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 US. 579, 591 (1993) (requiring a court to
determine if the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and can
be applied to the facts at hand).
299. See Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d at 602, 260 P.3d at 861–62 (“In civil cases, we
have neither expressly adopted Frye nor expressly rejected Daubert.”).
300. Id. at 606, 260 P.3d at 863; see also WASH. R. EVID. 401–403; State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d
351, 359, 869 P.2d 43, 47–8 (1994).
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upon are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” 301
Furthermore, “[e]xpert medical testimony must meet the standard of
reasonable medical certainty or reasonable medical probability.” 302
Because the loss-of-chance doctrine deals with percentages, which are
easily manipulable, 303 the judge’s role as gatekeeper for the admission of
expert testimony is crucial.
For example, taking the facts of Herskovits, the expert testimony first
would be necessary to show the standard of care was breached by not
initially diagnosing the lung cancer. Next, the expert must show that
statistically, the chances of survival at one stage are different from
another stage. This can be done using condensed, yet extensive,
statistical data based on the survival rates of cancer at the time of
diagnosis. 304 However, the most important piece of expert testimony
needs to establish that, at the time of the misdiagnosis, the patient was at
the claimed stage of cancer. This expert opinion can be developed by
looking at the x-rays, 305 although that may be too speculative, as it is
possible Mr. Herskovits did not, in fact have cancer at the beginning.
The expert opinion may also be proven if there is statistical data on the
growth rate of this specific type of tumor. 306 If so, the expert can take the
size of the tumor when it was actually diagnosed, and back date it to
determine what size the tumor was at the time of the diagnosis, or
alternatively, if there was a tumor at all. In sum, it is not enough for an
expert to simply opine there was a loss of chance. She must demonstrate,
through reliable data and to a degree of reasonable medical certainty
every aspect of the lost chance.

301. Anderson, 172 Wash. 2d at 606, 260 P.3d at 863 (citing State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713,
719, 684 P.2d 651, 654 (1984)).
302. Id. at 606–07, 260 P.3d at 864.
303. For example, an increase from 0.1% to 7.5% is an increase of a factor of 75, or an increase
of 7,500%. Both are mathematically correct.
304. See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 843 (Mass. 2008) (giving stage-specific
cancer survival rates in a special verdict form); King, supra note 25, at 546–47 (“[The doctrine’s]
successful application depends on the quality of the appraisal of the decreased likelihood of a more
favorable outcome . . . . ”); see also Mayo Clinic Staff, Cancer Survival Rate: What It Means For
Your Prognosis, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/
cancer/in-depth/cancer/art-20044517 (discussing survival rates of different stages of lung cancer).
305. See, e.g., Diagnostic Imaging, STANFORD MED. CANCER INST., http://cancer.stanford.edu/
information/cancerDiagnosis/diagnosticImaging.html (listing x-rays as one of three types of
imaging used to diagnose cancer) (last visited May 8, 2014).
306. See, e.g., Harald Weedon-Fekjaer et al., Breast Cancer Tumor Growth Estimated Through
Mammography Screening Data, 10 BREAST CANCER RES., no. 3, 2008, available at http://breastcancer-research.com/content/pdf/bcr2092.pdf (“Tumor growth can be estimated by comparing
tumor sizes from clinical-detected and screening-detected cases . . . .”).
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C.

In Order to Accurately Calculate Damages, the Ultimate Harm
Must Occur

Mohr and Dormaier did not specify whether the ultimate outcome
must come to pass, even though it is not the compensable injury. This
Comment argues that the harm must come about. This may seem
confusing at first, especially since this Comment advocates that the lost
chance and the harm must be kept separate. While the lost chance and
the harm are separate, they are also complementary, and necessary in
terms of calculating damages. If the ultimate outcome is death, but the
defendant’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the death,
damages will be what would have been awarded had the defendant
legally caused the death, multiplied by the percentage of chance lost. For
example, in Dormaier, the damages were calculated at $1,300,000.307
Applying the proportional approach, based on the jury’s verdict, the
award should have been 0.70 x 1,300,000 = $910,000.
There may be a case where the harm has yet to come about. 308 This
may be handled by relaxing the statute of limitations, and allowing for
suit to be brought when the harm materializes. 309 An argument has been
made to allow damages for mental distress, but this seems too attenuated
a claim, especially if redress is available due to a relaxed statute of
limitations. 310 This ensures that defendants are not liable for a harm that
may never come about, resulting in a windfall to the plaintiff.
In addition to requiring the ultimate negative result, courts should be
careful not to award damages that would have been incurred anyway.
For example, in Dickhoff v. Green, 311 a recent Supreme Court of
Minnesota case in which the court recognized the proportional approach,
the plaintiff baby had a visible tumor that went undiagnosed for a year
before treatment began. 312 However, the trial court correctly refused to
award damages for past medical expenses, and pain and suffering. 313
Had the plaintiff been diagnosed initially, she would still have had to
undergo all the same treatments. 314 These are the types of damages that

307. Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 177 Wash. App. 828, 842, 313 P.3d 431,
437 (2013).
308. King, supra note 23, at 510–11.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 511–15.
311. 836 N.W.2d 321, 326–27 (Minn. 2013).
312. Id. at 324–27.
313. Id. at 327.
314. Id.
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should be avoided.
D.

Relative Proportional Percentages Must Be Avoided

Relative proportional damages take into account the absolute
percentage of the chance lost.315 For example, a patient who went from a
40% chance of survival to a 20% chance of survival would not have lost
a 20% chance, but a 50% chance. Under relative proportionality, the
starting percentage is the absolute total. It is no longer on a 100%
scale. 316 A patient who went from a 4% chance of survival to a 1%
chance of survival would have lost a 75% chance, not 3%. This brief
analysis of the math of the relative proportional approach shows the
relative proportional approach’s inherent unfairness to defendants.
E.

The Conjunction Principle Should Not Be Employed

Damages and liability imposed based on the conjunction principle
should also be avoided. 317 The conjunction principle is a type of loss of
chance twice imposed. A good example may be found in the Illinois
Court of Appeals decision Bishop v. Tri County Radiologists Ltd., 318 in
which the plaintiff alleged there was a 10% to 20% chance the patient’s
cancer was in stage I rather than stage II when it was misdiagnosed and,
if so, the patient would have had a 40% to 50% better chance at
survival. 319 The 10% to 20% chance of the cancer being in an earlier
stage does not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard,
however some scholars would have loss of chance, in effect, applied
twice. 320 Damages would be calculated based on the conjunction
principle. 321 The conjunction principle multiplies both percentages by
each other and then multiplies that amount by the award for the ultimate
outcome. 322 In Bishop, for example, assume damages for death were
valued at $100,000, the chance the cancer was in another stage at

315. Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of a Chance Doctrine: An Argument for
a New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 16–17 (2003).
316. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (providing a more in-depth explanation of the
difference between relative and proportional percentages).
317. See King, supra note 25, at 554–56 (explaining the conjunction principle).
318. 653 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
319. Id. at 421–22.
320. See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 536–39, 554–56 (advocating for the application of the
conjunction principle).
321. Id. at 554–56.
322. Id.
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misdiagnosis was 10%, and the lost chance as a result of the
misdiagnosis was 40%. The equation would be 0.10 x 0.40 x $100,000 =
$4,000. The miniscule damages indicate it is unlikely a plaintiff will
employ this principle; however it is an unnecessary complication and
should not be used.
The conjunction principle may also be used by defendants to mitigate
damages. For example, if the test upon which the expert bases her
opinion has a known error rate of 10%, defendants could ask the jury to
apply the conjunction principle to account for the error rate. 323 Thus, if
the lost chance was 30% and the known error rate was 10%, we would
multiply 30% times 90% (accounting for the 10% error rate) to arrive at
a total lost chance of 27%. 324 Again, this is too complicated and should
not be allowed by either side. If there is a question as to the reliability of
the evidence, it should fall on the judge, as the gatekeeper, to determine
its admissibility. It should not be collaterally attacked through the
conjunction principle.
F.

Loss of a Chance Should Be a Judge-Made Tort and Not Forced
into an Existing Statute

It is unclear whether loss of chance may be brought under
Washington’s wrongful death statute 325 or its medical malpractice
statute. 326 This Comment advocates for a judge-made tort, as opposed to
trying to fit the doctrine into an existing statute. Such an approach
created great confusion in the Dormaier decision. 327 However, if the
doctrine were to be housed under a statute, the medical malpractice
statute 328 is more appropriate as it uses the language “injury”, and loss of
chance has been classified as an injury. Under the wrongful death
statute, Judge Pearson classified the loss of chance—for purposes of
fitting it into the statute—as the “cause” of the patient’s death.329 That
classification is part of what led to future confusion. In the absence of a
judge-made tort, and because loss of chance under the proportional

323. See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 555 (accounting for a 15% false negative rate, and
therefore multiplying the lost chance by .85 in arriving at net lost chance).
324. See id.
325. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (2012).
326. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012).
327. See supra Part II.D.1.
328. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040.
329. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 634, 664 P.2d 474, 487
(1983) (Pearson, J., concurring).
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approach is the injury itself, the medical malpractice statute, Revised
Code of Washington section 7.70.040, is a more fitting home for the
doctrine. If the ultimate outcome relating to the lost chance is death,
Washington’s survival statute, Revised Code of Washington section
4.2.046, 330 permits the bringing of the lost chance claim under the
medical malpractice statute because had the patient survived, the patient
could have brought that cause of action.
G.

A Loss of Chance Cause of Action Must Be Raised in the
Complaint

If a plaintiff wishes to argue loss of chance, the plaintiff must raise it
in the pleadings. The defendant must be fairly in a position to obtain
experts familiar with the science at issue and to present relevant
evidence to the jury. Fairness requires that the defendant know from the
very start that the defendant is defending not just causation for the
ultimate outcome, but against loss of chance as well, so that an
appropriate approach to discovery can be taken. The Dormaier Court—
in justifying why loss of chance need not be pleaded—stated that “a
complaint must identify the legal theory upon which the plaintiff seeks
relief.” 331 The loss-of-chance doctrine is a different theory upon which
to seek relief, distinct from the ultimate harm. Therefore, the complaint
should identify the loss of chance as a separate cause of action. As
demonstrated by the Dormaier decision, the loss-of-chance doctrine can
have significant impacts on the defense’s theory of the case. If the
defendant thinks he or she is defending solely against a wrongful death
claim, the defendant will focus on whether negligence caused the death.
If, during trial, the plaintiff elicits testimony to the effect of a 50% loss
of chance (especially when, as in Dormaier, the plaintiff also argued a
90% loss of chance), 332 the plaintiff now has a new cause of action to
bring to the jury. This in effect allows the plaintiff to hedge her bets at
the expense of the defendant. This can also confuse the jury—as may
have been the case in Dormaier 333—causing the jury to unwittingly grant
proximate cause of the ultimate outcome. Furthermore, if the defense is
on notice for wrongful death, and argues the negligence caused only a

330. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (2012).
331. Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 177 Wash. App. 828, 854, 313 P.3d 431,
443 (2013).
332. Id. at 852, 313 P.3d at 442.
333. The jury found that defendant’s negligence caused a 70% loss of chance, but was not the
proximate cause of death. Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437.

20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 12:23 PM

646

[Vol. 89:603

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

20% loss of chance, as an affirmative defense, the defense has just
argued itself into a lost chance instruction for the jury. In the interest of
fairness, and to facilitate discovery, loss of chance should be pleaded in
the complaint.
IV. SOLUTIONS IN PRACTICE: APPLYING THE FACTS OF
DORMAIER TO A CLARIFIED LOSS-OF-CHANCE
DOCTRINE
To demonstrate the applicability of the above-suggested solutions
designed to clarify the application of the loss-of-chance doctrine, this
Comment will now apply the solutions to the facts of Dormaier.
Mrs. Dormaier broke her elbow in a fall on September 15, 2007. 334
After receiving emergency care and following up with Dr. Canfield, she
was scheduled for surgery to repair the fracture on September 20. 335 On
September 18, Dr. Hart conducted a preoperative evaluation and
concluded she was fit for surgery. 336 The next day, Mrs. Dormaier
complained of chest and hip pain, and shortness of breath. 337 Dr.
Canfield ordered hip x-rays, which showed no fractures, and chest xrays, which revealed patchy infiltrate 338 or atelectasis 339 in one lung. 340
The doctors concluded the atelectasis was a result of her shallow
breathing due to pain, and decided to go ahead with the planned
surgery. 341 Mr. Misasi, her nurse anesthetist on the day of surgery,
consulted with Dr.’s Hart and Canfield and anesthetized her at 12:10
p.m. 342 Mrs. Dormaier suffered a cardiac arrest during surgery and
passed away at 3:00 p.m. 343 The autopsy showed that a large blood clot
had detached from a pelvic deep vein thrombosis in her hip and blocked
her lung arteries. 344 In the hours and days leading up to her death, many
334. Id. at 836, 313 P.3d at 434.
335. Id. at 837, 313 P.3d at 434.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 837 n.1, 313 P.3d at 434 n.1 (“‘Patchy infiltrate’ is the displacement of air space by an
infiltrating substance in the lung. It is a nonspecific chest x-ray finding that could indicate, for
example, atelectasis, pneumonia, or pulmonary embolism.”).
339. Id. at 837 n.2, 313 P.3d at 434 n.2 (“‘Atelectasis’ is the collapse of tiny air sacs in the
lung.”).
340. Id. at 837, 313 P.3d at 434
341. Id.
342. Id. at 835–38, 313 P.3d at 435.
343. Id. at 837–38, 313 P.3d at 435.
344. Id.
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smaller blood clots had been lodging in her lung arteries. 345 The pelvic
deep vein thrombosis (PDVT) 346 “released many smaller emboli, which
caused survivable pulmonary embolisms, but finally released a large
embolus, which caused a fatal pulmonary embolism.” 347 Following the
close of evidence, the plaintiff successfully requested a loss of chance
jury instruction. 348 The jury found that Mr. Misasi’s negligence was not
the proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s death, but did cause a 70% loss
of chance of survival. 349
The facts of Dormaier do warrant the bringing of a loss of chance
cause of action. However, as the following application will demonstrate,
certain requirements must be met in the interests of clarity and fairness.
First, loss of chance as a cause of action must be pleaded in the initial
complaint. It may be brought under Washington’s medical malpractice
statute, 350 or by its standing as a judge-made tort. Even though the
ultimate outcome in this case is death, the lost chance is the actionable
injury, and thus not bringing the claim under the wrongful death statute
is appropriate. In Dormaier, the plaintiff only pleaded that the
defendant’s negligence resulted in Mrs. Dormaier’s death, 351 which,
under the proposed solutions, would not allow for a lost chance jury
instruction. The plaintiff is free to plead loss of chance, regardless of the
starting or total percentage, but a lost chance argument of 50%–90% is
too broad. Because loss of chance may now be pleaded at any
percentage, there is no longer a need for the plaintiff’s attorneys to
“hedge their bets” in assigning percentage lost, being certain to hit the
50% or below benchmark. Therefore, the plaintiff can be, and should be,
more precise in assigning the percentage lost. At the time of pleading,
the exact or estimated percentage lost may not be definitively
established, but pleading the cause of action will at least put the defense
on notice that it will be defending against a distinct claim.
Furthermore, pleading loss of chance would not, in this case,
foreclose the option of pleading wrongful death. The two may be
345. Id. at 838, 313 P.3d at 435.
346. Id. at 838 n.4, 313 P.3d at 435 n.4 (“A blood clot is a thrombus when attached to a blood
vessel wall and an embolus when detached and migrating through the bloodstream. A pelvic deep
venous thrombosis is the formation of a thrombus in the hip’s deep veins. A pulmonary embolism is
the lodging of an embolus in the lung’s arteries.”).
347. Id. at 838, 313 P.3d at 435.
348. Id. at 840–41, 313 P.3d at 436–37.
349. Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437.
350. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012).
351. See Joint Brief of Appellants at 12, Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 177
Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013) (No. 30864-2-III).
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pleaded in the alternative. However, in employing solely the
proportional approach, a lost chance of 51% or greater will only result in
proportional damages. It will not morph into the all-or-nothing approach
to qualify as proximate cause for the wrongful death. 352
Second, once pleaded, it is crucial that the judge, as gate keeper,
adhere to strict evidentiary standards. The admissibility of evidence is
where the Dormaier trial court fell short. Based on the evidence
presented, the case should have been dismissed as a matter of law for
failure to provide evidence of causation for the lost chance or death. 353
In its summary of the facts the Court of Appeals stated that “a pelvic
deep vein thrombosis initially released many smaller emboli, which
caused survivable pulmonary embolisms, but finally released a large
embolus, which caused a fatal pulmonary embolism.” 354 However, the
testimony used at trial, and cited by the Court of Appeals, dealt with the
small, survivable pulmonary embolisms, not the large, fatal embolus
from the PDVT. 355 Had Mrs. Dormaier been diagnosed with these
“survivable pulmonary embolisms,” she would have had a 90% chance
of survival. However, the pulmonary embolisms present before surgery
did not kill her. It was the detachment of a massive one-centimeter
embolus from her hip that blocked the artery that feeds both lung
branches. 356 The plaintiff’s expert testimony also admitted that
administering heparin would not have dissolved the fatal clot in time;
that even if detected, a skilled surgeon would have needed to be present
to remove the clot in time; and did not opine as to the probability of
survival of patients with very large pelvic clots. 357 Because the evidence
presented did not show that any action or inaction by Mr. Misasi
impacted Mrs. Dormaier’s chances of survival, the testimony was
insufficient to allow the case to continue.
Therefore, under the proposed solutions of this Comment, the
evidence must accomplish two things. First, the evidence must purport to
establish that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose Mrs.
Dormaier’s PDVT, not that they negligently failed to diagnose a

352. See infra Appendix A; Appendix B; Appendix C.
353. See Rasmussen v. Bendotti, 107 Wash. App. 947, 958, 29 P.3d 56, 62 (2001) (“The
consideration is whether the ultimate result and the defendant’s acts are substantially connected, and
not too remote to impose liability.”).
354. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 837–38, 313 P.3d at 435 (emphasis added).
355. Id. at 839–40, 313 P.3d at 435–36.
356. Joint Reply Brief of Appellants at 8–10, Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia,
177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013) (No. 30864-2-III).
357. Id. at 9–12.
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condition that did not cause her death. At the very least, testimony
should be given to the effect that Mrs. Dormaier’s pulmonary embolisms
should have been diagnosed, and the presence of such, in conjunction
with her unexplained hip pain would have led a reasonable doctor to
conduct further tests to check for PDVT. Second, the evidence must
show—on a diagnosis of the PDVT—what the chances are of breaking
up the PDVT using heparin. For example, testimony would need to
establish that when a PDVT of “x” size is diagnosed and promptly
treated, the chances of an embolus detaching and creating a fatal
pulmonary embolism are “y%.”
Not only must this evidence be presented, it must also be reliable. As
Mohr indicates, this needs to be shown, among other things, through
data. 358 In Dormaier, Dr. Swenson testified that “[i]t’s been my
experience over the entire time of my career that if we can diagnose this,
we have a good chance once beginning therapy to take a mortality rate
of possibly 70 to 80 percent, and bring it down into the 10 to 20 percent
rate.” 359 The actual lost percentage is 50% to 70%, but testimony was
also elicited that the lost percentage was 90%. 360 Notwithstanding the
fact that this testimony pertained to a condition that did not kill Mrs.
Dormaier, this was based on the doctor’s experience, not data. How can
a trier of fact know if these percentages are accurate? Did the doctor
compile patient data in order to arrive at this percentage? Did he use
recognized studies? Furthermore, per Akzo, an argued lost chance of
50% to 90% does not fall within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. 361 A lost chance spanning 40% is simply too broad.
As for the application of the other proposed solutions: (1) the ultimate
outcome did come to pass; (2) avoiding relative proportionality depends
on the lost chance percentage settled on. For example, if Mrs.
Dormaier’s chances of survival went from 90% to 20%, the lost
percentage is 70%, not the relative proportional percentage of 78%; and
(3) nothing in the fact pattern suggests the use of a conjunction principle,
and even if it did, that principle should not be employed.
To summarize how this Comment’s proposed solutions would deal
with the Dormaier facts, the plaintiff may maintain a cause of action for
loss of chance of survival or a better outcome, however certain criteria
must be met. First, the cause of action must be pleaded in the initial
358. See Mohr v. Grantham, 172 Wash. 2d 844, 857–58, 262 P.3d 490, 496–97 (2011).
359. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 839, 313 P.3d at 435.
360. Id. at 839, 313 P.3d at 436.
361. See Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d 593, 606–07, 260 P.3d 857, 864
(2011) (“Expert medical testimony must meet the standard of reasonable medical certainty . . . .”).
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complaint and brought under Washington’s medical malpractice statute.
Second, any lost percentage may be claimed. However, regardless of the
percentage lost, if proven, the lost chance remains the distinct injury and
does not morph into proximate cause for the ultimate outcome. Finally,
there must be reliable expert evidence, based on data and experience,
relating both to the cause of the lost chance, and the reliability of the
percentage presented.
CONCLUSION
The loss-of-chance doctrine has created no small amount of
confusion, both in Washington and the rest of the country. The path to
adoption or rejection of the loss-of-chance doctrine is often fraught with
confusion and misinterpretation. While the doctrine’s heart is in the right
place, its application can be terribly confusing. Much of the difficulty
surrounding loss of chance is that “loss of chance” is used as an
umbrella term for no less than three distinct approaches. The three
approaches—all-or-nothing, substantial factor, and proportional—have
different legal requirements and apply differently to the same set of
facts. To further complicate matters, some states, like Washington, wind
up employing two approaches, as the proportional approach can morph
into the all-or-nothing approach after the lost chance is 51% or greater.
The key is identifying which approach to associate with loss of chance
and sticking to it. Having the loss of chance stand for two or more
approaches is untenable and unworkable. This Comment first advocates
for the proportional approach, applied at any percentage. This eliminates
the all-or-nothing approach, and keeps the lost chance as a separate and
distinct injury from the ultimate outcome. Second, this Comment
advocates for stricter evidentiary standards when dealing with
percentages and lost chances. Finally, in the interest of fairness, loss of
chance as a cause of action should be pleaded in the initial complaint.
The application of the proposed solutions proves that they can, and
should, be applied in a practical setting.
APPENDIX
a. Loss of a Chance Jury Instruction
The loss of a chance is a separate and distinct injury from the ultimate
outcome. If you find the defendant’s negligence caused the ultimate
harm or injury to the plaintiff, you do not need to consider loss of a
chance any further. If, however, you find that the defendant’s negligence
caused the plaintiff to lose a chance at a better outcome, but did not
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cause the ultimate harm, the lost chance is the injury, and you must
decide what percentage the lost chance is. Loss of chance must be
proven by traditional tort standards. Therefore, the defendant health care
provider must have owed the patient a duty. The health care provider
must then have acted negligently. That negligence must have
proximately caused the lost chance, but not the ultimate outcome. If the
ultimate outcome was proximately caused by the defendant’s
negligence, the loss of chance is irrelevant. Damages must be calculated
proportionally. In order to determine damages, you must first determine
what the damages would be had the defendant’s negligence caused the
ultimate outcome. Then you must multiply the damages for the ultimate
harm by the percentage of the chance lost.
b. Definitions
“Ultimate harm or injury” means the final outcome, i.e., death or
other significant injury.
“Loss of chance” is a separate injury, distinct from the ultimate
outcome. It is the percentage by which the Plaintiff’s chances of
avoiding the ultimate harm or injury were reduced.
c. Special Verdict Form
1. Was Defendant negligent in his treatment of the Plaintiff?
Answer:
INSTRUCTION: If you answer “no” to Question 1, do not answer any
other questions. If you answered “yes” to Question 1, proceed to
Question 2.
2. Was the Defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s
______________(ultimate injury or harm)?
Answer:
INSTRUCTION: If you answer “yes” to Question 2, do not answer
Questions 3 or 4, and skip to Question 5. If you answer “no” to Question
2, proceed to Question 3.
3. Was the Defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s
lost chance of a better outcome?
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Answer:
INSTRUCTION: If you answer “no” to Question 3, do not answer any
other questions. If you answer “yes” to Question 3, proceed to Question
4.
4. What was the percentage lost?
Answer: ___%
INSTRUCTIONS: Proceed to Question 5.
5. What do you find to be the amount of the Plaintiff’s damages?
(Calculate damages for the ultimate harm, even if you found that the
Defendant’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s
ultimate harm or injury.)
Answer: $__________
INSTRUCTIONS: If you answered Question 4, proceed to Question 6.
If you answered “yes” to Question 2, these are your total damages.
6. Multiply the percentage lost by the damages:
____% x $_______ = $ ______________
INSTRUCTIONS: These are your damages for the loss of a chance.

